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This case study compared a Switzerland based non-governmental organization (NGO) 
and a U.S. based NGO’s persuasive efforts with the Syrian armed opposition to cease 
their practice of killing and harming civilians (civilian targeting).  The Swiss NGO 
portion entailed in-depth interviews with staff and a training partner as well as a 
qualitative content analysis of campaign videos, training booklets and modules, a 
conference report, a strategy document, and opposition authored code of conduct 
documents.  The U.S. NGO portion involved an in-depth interview with an expert from 
its Middle East office and a qualitative content analysis of organizational press releases, 
full reports, and letters as well as opposition authored letters to the U.S. NGO.  The 
findings revealed that the Swiss and U.S. NGOs had some similar approaches including 
utilizing some of the same social media channels, advocating costs for committing 
civilian targeting, and emphasizing their neutrality in their organizations’ portrayal.  
Alternatively, other aspects of their approaches differed such as the degree to which they 
relied on interpersonal networks and written communiqués as channels, if they primarily 
leveraged direct messaging or both direct and indirect messaging, if they emphasized the 
benefits of ceasing civilian targeting, how they leveraged partnerships, and their 
commitment strategies.  The Swiss NGO’s dissemination channels included meetings and 
trainings that incorporated techniques such as role playing, campaign videos, and 
booklets; future channels will leverage mobile apps and card games.  The U.S. NGO’s 
channels comprised written communiqués, Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, Facebook, Twitter, 
and YouTube.  Both NGOs addressed the opposition’s hostile attitudes towards civilian 
Alawites and civilian regime supporters.  The Swiss NGO directly messaged opposition 
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groups and tailored messages to a group’s views of international and Islamic laws; 
messages stressed the costs of committing civilian targeting and the benefits of ceasing 
the behavior.  Alternatively, the U.S. NGO directly messaged opposition groups about the 
costs of civilian targeting and indirectly messaged certain opposition groups, by reaching 
out to third parties, such as Gulf states, with perceived influence on these groups on ways 
to inflict costs on them for their civilian targeting.  Both NGOs placed a priority on 
portraying their neutrality.  The Swiss NGO relied on local Syrian partners to gain access 
and build trust with opposition groups, while the U.S. NGO leveraged partnerships to 
bolster messaging around the costs of civilian targeting.  Additionally, the Swiss NGO, 
adopting a long-term approach, used formal and informal commitment strategies 
depending on the opposition group.  The U.S. NGO presented opposition groups with 
opportunities to make public written commitments to stop their civilian targeting.  
Finally, various recommendations are offered for communication practitioners seeking to 
influence the opposition and similar armed non-state actors including: employing 
channels such as interpersonal networks, Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube; segmenting opposition audiences based on a group’s beliefs, attitudes, or 
nationalities; messaging groups about the costs of conducting civilian targeting and the 
benefits of ceasing the behavior; partnering with organizations opposition groups trust; 
and pursuing long-term approaches that empower opposition groups to make 
commitments to civilian protection. 
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This study explored how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are trying to 
persuade the Syrian opposition to cease from killing and harming civilians.   It 
specifically examined the efforts of two international NGOs, and a brief description of 
these organizations is presented in the Method chapter.  
The Syrian conflict began in March 2011 when Syrian civilians carried out non-
violent protests against the Syrian regime’s detention of young activists (Sterling, 2012).  
The regime responded with force, killing protestors, which led to more protests (“Syria 
profile,” 2014).  Syrian President Assad then made some political concessions, yet the 
regime continued to use force against any sign of political dissent.  In June 2011, the first 
significant armed attacks against the regime occurred when armed groups killed 120 state 
security forces in northern Syria (Pecanha, Saad, & G.V., 2012).  Later in July 2011, the 
Free Syrian Army (FSA) announced its formation, making it the first public face of the 
armed opposition (Delaney, 2012).  Yet, the FSA never had command and control of the 
many local and foreign fighter groups that eventually surfaced in the conflict and that 
came under the umbrella of the wider opposition.  The conflict continued to grow more 
violent, and both the state and the opposition have targeted civilians (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014).  In March 2014, at least 2,500,000 Syrians were refugees in the region, 
and close to 10,000,000 Syrians, who remained in the country, required aid, such as 
water, food, shelter, and medical treatment (U.S. Department of State, 2014).  
Furthermore, by May 2014, over 160,000 people had died from the violence and 
approximately one third were civilians (McClam, 2014). The scale of civilian casualties 
and harm emphasizes the importance of NGOs’ persuasive efforts with the opposition 
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regarding the need to cease killing and harming civilians.   
 Several terms are used in presenting the study.  First, the term opposition refers to 
both Syrian and foreign fighters, who at any point since the conflict’s inception engaged 
in active combat against the Syrian regime.  It therefore includes the Kurdish groups.  
However, this label is not meant to understate the complexity and decentralized nature of 
the opposition.  The opposition is composed of many groups each with unique political 
and ideological aims, structures, and leadership styles.  The opposition is an example of 
an armed non-state actor (ANSA).  ANSAs include groups outside of a state’s control that 
engage in violence in seeking out their aims (Hofmann & Schneckener, 2011).  Other 
general examples of ANSAs are gangs, militias, or terrorist groups.  Alternatively, states 
are recognized countries, such as Syria, that are geographically bound and have defined 
structures.  Lastly, the term civilian targeting signifies the killing and harming of 
civilians, while civilian protection refers to preventing civilian casualties and harm. 
The study’s findings will be valuable to communication professionals from 
international bodies, states, and other NGOs that are working to influence the opposition.  
For example, a United Nations (UN) message to both the Syrian opposition and the 
Syrian government stated that they should “at last live up to their responsibility under 
humanitarian law and stop targeting civilian areas” (UN News Centre, 2014, para. 7).   
The findings may offer insight on how the UN can further tailor messages that stress 
costs for civilian targeting.  The results may also inform U.S. messaging efforts for the 
opposition during military and political exchanges.  For example, messages promoting 
the benefits of civilian protection could reveal how to frame gains the opposition can 
make for changing their behavior.  Also, some foreign NGOs in Syria operate under 
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fictitious names (Associated Foreign Press, 2013).  The results may yield insight on how 
NGOs can emphasize message content over source characteristics.  Lastly, the study may 
help professionals who aim to influence other regional ANSAs.  For example, in Libya, 
militias often conduct attacks placing civilians at risk (Al Warfalli & Bosalum, 2014).  
Messages for the opposition could be adapted to engage Libyan militias about civilian 
protection.   
 Numerous articles highlighted persuasive techniques that NGOs utilized in 
influencing ANSAs to follow aspects of international humanitarian norms, which directly 
relate to civilian protection (Bangerter, 2011; Bellal & Casey-Maslen, 2011; Hofmann, 
2012).  Hofmann (2012) described how the NGO Geneva Call created the “Deed of 
Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation 
in Mine Action,” which enables ANSAs to make written declarations against the 
production and use of landmines and to participate in landmine destruction and follow-up 
observations ensuring their commitments.  She also discussed the International 
Committee of the Red Cross’s persuasive messages with ANSAs regarding international 
humanitarian laws including how ANSAs could maintain military advantages, notably 
well-controlled units; preserve funding and infrastructure; gain credibility with the 
adversary; influence the adversary to reciprocate behaviors, such as respecting ANSAs’ 
prisoners under the adversary’s control; enhance their legitimacy with local and global 
parties; have cultural beliefs that coincide with humanitarian laws; and avoid legal 
prosecution for non-compliance.  Other articles, such as one by Bellal and Casey-Maslen 
(2011), noted similar persuasive messages but viewed the issue through a legal lens.  
They addressed why ANSAs must follow international laws and reasons for their non-
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compliance, including the belief that compliance would lead to operational losses.  The 
articles provided value in understanding persuasive messages for engaging ANSAs about 
civilian targeting.  Yet, some studies did not entail primary research, and none explored 
the issue within the Syrian context.  This study addressed this gap by presenting an in-
depth, evidence based comparison of two NGOs’ persuasive efforts with the Syrian 
opposition.   
  





While the available primary literature did not specifically address NGOs’ 
persuasive efforts with the opposition regarding civilian targeting, broader studies 
provided valuable insights on ANSAs and Arab audiences.  I first reviewed Syrian 
information sources, including their use of international media, personal networks, and 
the Internet.  Next, I discussed studies that examined how identity impacted intergroup 
attitudes.  I then outlined several persuasive techniques starting with a review of the 
contradictory results found in shaming efforts in influencing ANSAs and states’ violent 
behavior.  After presenting the shaming research, I presented evidence related to source 
principles, highlighting how respect for authority was low in certain Arab audiences and 
source likeability increased the likelihood of supporting a domestic policy in a 
transnational context.  Finally, I addressed how external commitments to peace treaties 
and internal commitments to codes of behavior contributed to ANSAs’ reduced levels of 
violence.  
Syrian Information Sources 
 
 While the literature did not address the opposition’s specific information sources, 
it examined the role that international media, personal networks, and the Internet served 
in delivering information to similar Syrian target audiences.  Charney and Quirk (2014) 
produced a report for the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre on Syrian civilians’ 
views of transitional justice that included insights on Syrian information sources.  They 
used a snowball sampling technique to carry out in-depth interviews with 46 Syrian 
civilians living in Syria, Jordan, and Turkey.  The sample included both civilians who 
approved and disapproved of the state (32 men and 14 women).  The findings showed 
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that participants, who disapproved of the state, followed television news, notably Al 
Arabiya, Al Jazeera, Shada Al Huriah, Deir el Zor, and Arabic formats of BBC, CNN, 
France 24, and Sky News.  (Al Arabiya is a United Arab Emirate based news outlet, Al 
Jazeera is a Qatar based outlet, and Shada Al Huriah and Deir el Zor are Syria based 
outlets.)  They also received information from family and friends through phone and 
Internet communications.  The researchers noted when seeking out information online, 
participants, who disapproved of the state, relied on Facebook, Twitter, local activists’ 
pages, and news outlets’ webpages, such as Al Jazeera’s site.  While the sample involved 
civilians who disapproved of the Syrian state and not specifically opposition members, it 
offered a similar target audience.  Given that these target audiences share similar political 
views, they may rely on similar information sources.  It is possible that these news 
sources, personal networks, and websites may serve as information pipelines to the 
opposition.  
 Another study highlighted the challenges of reaching Syrians, focusing on Syrian 
refugees’ information sources and distrust in certain communication channels (Giovanni, 
2013).  The research team completed surveys with over 100 Syrian refugees (74% men 
and 26% women) in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon; Beirut, Lebanon; and Tripoli, Lebanon.   
The results indicated that a majority of participants (60%) relied on social networks of 
family and friends for trusted information with television (21%), specifically Al Arabiya 
and Al Jazeera as their next trusted source of information.  Most respondents (63%) also 
relied on Short Message Service (SMS) and Whatsapp as a means for exchanging 
information.  Also, participants reported distrust in the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) believing that the organization could not protect 
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their personal data, which could place them and their families at risk.  Similar to the 
aforementioned study, the study’s sample of Syrian refugees somewhat differed from the 
current study’s focus on the opposition.  Yet, it provided further evidence of how some 
Syrians relied on informal networks, international media, and the Internet for 
information, which likely reflects some of the opposition’s information sources given the 
overlap between the target audiences.  It also highlighted that some Syrians distrust 
information disseminated from UN bodies, which could have negative implications for 
NGOs who rely on UN bodies to convey messages to the opposition about civilian 
protection.       
 Lastly, a separate study examined the Arab blog environment describing the 
networks, dialogues, and information interests of Arab bloggers (Etling, Kelly, Faris, & 
Palfrey, 2010).  The research team employed a mixed methods approach including a 
social network analysis and computer textual analysis of 6,451 blogs and a human textual 
analysis of 3,340 of these blogs.   The results showed that Syrian bloggers authored 
content focused on domestic topics, such as politics, and of all the Arab bloggers, they 
were the most likely to criticize their political leadership.  The findings also indicated that 
Arab bloggers most frequently provided links to YouTube (2070), Wikipedia (932), Al 
Jazeera (817), BBC (816), and Flicker (795), and a sample of the most frequently linked 
YouTube videos addressed political topics.  While the study occurred prior to the Syrian 
conflict, Syrian bloggers’ dissent of Syrian leadership made them a similar target 
audience as the opposition.  It is possible that the opposition may follow and even 
participate in political blogs and YouTube videos that are critical of the Syrian regime.  
The findings also presented further evidence that Syrians opposed to Syria’s political 
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state followed Al Jazeera and BBC, which bolsters the argument that the opposition may 
follow these international news sources.  
 The articles portrayed that some Syrians with anti-regime views and those in the 
wider Syrian refugee population relied on several information sources: Al Arabiya, Al 
Jazeera, and BBC; informal networks of family and friends; and Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, and political blogs.  The findings also revealed how some Syrians distrusted 
UN channels.  While the results offered value in understanding the broader Syrian 
information environment, it remains unclear where the opposition turns to for trusted 
information.  The current study examined the communication channels NGOs employ to 
reach the opposition and their reasons for using these channels.  
Attitudes 
 
 One of the themes in the literature regarding attitudes and armed conflict was how 
individuals’ social identities impacted their attitudes towards relevant in-groups and out-
groups and how this affected conflict.  Tajfel (as cited in Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors, 
& Preston, 2010) described social identity as a person’s view of himself/herself based on 
his/her association in certain groups and the importance placed on these ties.  Groups that 
an individual is a member of are in-groups, whereas groups that an individual is not a 
member of are out-groups (Cottam et al., 2010).   
One study that investigated civilian protection in the Syrian conflict specifically 
addressed the opposition’s attitudes towards civilians (Civilians in Conflict, 2012).  The 
study involved interviews with opposition members in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Turkey.  The results demonstrated varying attitudes towards civilians within the 
opposition.  FSA members remarked that following an operation in Homs their leadership 
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held a meeting to evaluate battlefield tactics to assess if civilians had been endangered.  
This finding suggested that some opposition members were concerned about civilian 
protection.  Alternatively, other findings showed that some opposition members believed 
that it was acceptable to target Alawite civilians, and Syrian President Assad’s Alawite 
paramilitaries further exacerbated this belief.  (Alawite is a sect of Shia Islam, and 
President Assad’s family and supporters are Alawites.)  This particular finding revealed 
that certain opposition members viewed Alawite civilians as an out-group that was 
aligned with the enemy, making them a legitimate target.  The results also indicated that 
while some opposition members did not intentionally target civilians, they viewed 
civilian casualties and harm as part of the cost of war.  When discussing payments for 
family members of victims, one fighter stated, “It’s a war, people die.  I am not supposed 
to pay” (Civilians in Conflict, 2012, p. 9). 
Licata, Klein, Saade, Azzi, and Branscombe (2011) delved deeper in exploring 
the relationship between self-identity and intergroup attitudes, but they examined it 
within the Lebanese context and identified how perceptions of blame for Lebanon’s civil 
war and perceived connections between former and current out-group members mediated 
attitudes.  The researchers utilized an Internet survey and had a final sample of 102 
respondents (47% were men, 44% were women, and 9% did not specify their sex), who 
were Lebanese Christian Maronite students.  On an eight-point scale with options varying 
from definitely disagree to definitely agree, participants responded to questions about 
their level of identification as Maronites (a religious sectarian identity) and Lebanese (a 
national identity); attitudes towards Muslims; beliefs that Muslims, external parties, or 
Maronites were to blame for Lebanon’s civil war; and perceptions of continuity 
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(similarity) between currently young Muslims and Muslims who were young during the 
conflict.  They found that participants identified more with being Lebanese (M = 7.42) 
than Maronite (M = 6.57).  Also, a multiple regression analysis showed that a Lebanese 
identity increased the likelihood of holding positive attitudes towards Muslims (b = .52, p 
< .000), and a Maronite identity increased the likelihood of holding negative attitudes 
towards Muslims (b = -.27, p < .002).  The results meant that individuals with a strong 
Lebanese (national) identity were more likely to view other Lebanese out-groups, 
specifically Lebanese Muslims, favorably.  However, individuals with a strong Maronite 
(religious sectarian) identity were more likely to view other religious sectarian out-
groups, specifically Lebanese Muslims, unfavorably.  Thus, individuals who strongly 
identify with their religious sectarian group (in-group) may hold negative attitudes 
towards individuals, who share their nationality but belong to a different religious 
sectarian group (out-group).  Although the study’s sample focused on civilians’ attitudes 
and not ANSAs’ attitudes, it was relevant to the current study because it examined an 
Arab in-group’s attitudes towards an Arab out-group with the same national identity.  It 
may suggest that opposition members, with stronger national identities than religious 
sectarian identities, might view Syrian civilians with different religious sectarian 
identities favorably, making these members less likely to engage in civilian targeting.  
Alternatively, opposition members with stronger religious sectarian identities (in-group) 
than national identities may be more likely to hold negative views towards Syrian 
civilians with different religious sectarian identities (out-group), making these members 
more susceptible to engage in civilian targeting.  
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 A different study examined how threats influenced hostile inter-group attitudes 
between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in Rwanda prior to and during the genocide 
(McDoom, 2012).  The researcher applied the case study method including a content 
analysis of Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines broadcasts, which had connections 
to Rwanda’s Hutu dominated government; a survey with a cluster sample of 294 
Rwandans, including 273 Hutu and 21 Tutsi and 104 individuals who participated in the 
violence and 190 individuals who did not participate in the violence; and in-depth 
interviews with Rwandans from two northern and two southern communities.  One 
finding revealed how increased threats increased out-group homogenization, which meant 
Hutu Rwandans began to see all members of the ethnic out-group (Tutsi) as the same.  
The content analysis showed that references associating Inyenzi (derogatory term for 
Tutsi) with all Tutsi significantly grew from prior to the genocide (0.0% of all 96,961 
words in pre-genocide sample) to the genocide period (2.0% of all 313,106 words in 
genocide sample, p < .01); references unclearly distinguishing between Inyenzi and Tutsi 
significantly rose over time (.1% of all 96,961 words in pre-genocide sample and 17.1% 
of all 313,106 words in genocide sample, p < .01).  Survey results showed that during the 
genocide 70.5% of Hutu respondents believed that all and only Tutsi were the enemy, 
while only 1.9% of Hutu respondents believed that only the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
rebels (primarily composed of Tutsi) were the enemy.  Findings from in-depth interviews 
complemented these quantitative results where one Hutu respondent in describing 
perceptions of Tutsi neighbors after the attacks began stated, “’If they [our neighbors] 
were not accomplices they would have told us that the country was going to be attacked.  
If they did not inform us…they must be the enemy’” (McDoom, 2012, p. 149).  While the 
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sample examined a different target population than the current study, it revealed that 
during conflict Rwandan Hutu (in-group) did not always perceive differences between 
the enemy rebels (primarily comprised of Tutsi) and the broader Rwandan Tutsi 
population (out-group), leading many Hutu to negatively view Tutsi.  The takeaway for 
the current study is that opposition members with strong ethnic in-group identities may 
not perceive differences between Syrian civilians and Syrian regime combatants from the 
same ethnic out-groups, which may cause some opposition members to negatively view 
these Syrian civilians.  These negative attitudes may contribute to these opposition 
members engaging in civilian targeting.   
 These studies highlighted how religious sectarian (non-Alawite and Christian 
Maronite) and ethnic (Rwandan Hutu) in-group identities contributed to negative 
attitudes of relevant out-group members in conflict settings.  The previously outlined 
opposition study offered insight on how the opposition’s attitudes towards Alawite out-
groups negatively impacted civilian protection, yet additional research is needed on this 
topic.  It is important to understand the range of attitudes within the opposition, so that 
behavior change messages regarding civilian targeting can be tailored appropriately.  The 
current study explored how NGOs understand attitudes within the opposition and how it 
impacted their persuasive messages regarding the need to cease civilian targeting.   
Persuasive Techniques 
 
Shaming.  Several studies explored organizations’ shaming efforts in influencing 
state and ANSAs’ violent behavior, yet they offered mixed results on the effectiveness of 
this persuasive technique.  Hafner-Burton (2008) examined how shaming efforts 
impacted states’ human rights behaviors in 145 states between 1975 and 2000.  The 
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independent variables were Amnesty International press releases and reports, Newsweek 
and The Economist articles, and United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR) resolutions.  The researcher borrowed from Ron, Ramos, & Rodgers’s work 
(as cited in Hafner-Burton, 2008) to examine Amnesty shaming, which analyzed the total 
press releases and reports denouncing human rights abuses in a specific state in a given 
year.  Newsweek and The Economist shaming data came from Ramos, Ron, and Thoms’s 
study (as cited in Hafner-Burton, 2008) that determined the average number of stories on 
human rights in a state each year, and UNCHR shaming data involved resolutions 
criticizing a state’s human rights practices in a specific year building from Lebovic and 
Voeten’s work (as cited in Hafner-Burton, 2008).  The dependent variables were political 
terror, which included acts such as killings, kidnappings, and incarceration; and political 
rights abuses, which comprised acts such as manipulating elections and unequal 
representation within government bodies. Finally, the control variables included two 
variables about a state’s governing structure, gross domestic product (GDP), population, 
and the presence of civil or interstate war.  The method involved several regression 
analyses.  One finding revealed that states’ use of terror rose following Amnesty shaming 
(b = 0.02, p < .01), indicating that an NGO’s efforts may have had a small impact in 
increasing human rights violations.  Other results were insignificant suggesting that 
media and UN shaming also did not reduce human rights violations.  The author further 
found that states adopting treaties committed more political rights violations post 
shaming.  These early findings implied that shaming was ineffective in reducing violence, 
and public commitments did not positively impact political behavior.   
 Murdie and Davis’s (2012) study acknowledged Hafner-Burton’s (2008) findings 
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that shaming may not positively impact states’ behavior and argued that other factors 
must exist.  They investigated shaming efforts between 1992 and 2004 in approximately 
130 states.  (The authors’ original sample was 130 states.  Yet, their testing only 
examined states with weaker human rights records, and the final sample was unclear.)  
The independent variables consisted of international human rights organizations’ (HRO) 
shaming, the existence of HROs in a state, and third party targeting.  HRO shaming 
comprised the annual total of instances where HROs took action against a specific state 
for a human rights issue, such as Human Rights Watch ordering Macedonia to act in 
November 2001.  Third party targeting was the total instances of human rights criticisms 
from bodies that were external to the targeted state and non-HROs but referenced HROs 
in their shaming.  One case was in 2002 when the U.K. condemned Iraq and referenced 
an Amnesty study.  One dependent variable was improvements in physical integrity 
rights over time, and physical integrity rights encompassed murders, torture, 
incarceration, and kidnappings.  The control variables were GDP, regime type, 
population, and interstate and intrastate conflicts.  Applying an ordered probit analysis, 
the researchers found that HRO shaming, if done with the existence of HROs in a state, 
positively contributed to improvements in physical integrity rights (b = .065, p < .10) but 
this finding was not statistically significant.  They further examined the variables finding 
that higher numbers of HROs in a state increased the likelihood of success of HRO 
shaming in improving physical integrity rights.  Also, HRO shaming, if done with third 
party targeting, helped increase improvements in physical integrity rights (b = .004, p < 
.01), and this finding was significant.  Higher levels of third party targeting also 
positively impacted the effectiveness of HRO shaming in improving physical integrity 
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rights.  While the study did not focus on ANSAs, it provided insights for the current 
study.  Syria’s ongoing violence and instability likely make it difficult for Syria based 
HROs to function effectively on a daily basis.  HRO shaming coupled with third party 
targeting could be effective in influencing the opposition’s use of violence against 
civilians.  
 Krain (2012) took a different approach from the outlined studies by focusing on 
shaming effects on genocides and politicides in 25 states between 1976 and 2008.  
Similar to Hafner-Burton (2008), he chose Amnesty news and reports, Newsweek and The 
Economist articles, UNCHR targeting, and the severity of UNCHR punishments as 
independent variables.  However, Krain (2012) examined Amnesty news and reports 
separately leveraging Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers’s data (as cited in Krain, 2012) that 
described human rights violations in a state in a given year.  Newsweek and The 
Economist shaming utilized Ramos, Ron, and Thoms’s coding and data (as cited in Krain, 
2012) to identify the average amount of stories each year on a state’s human rights 
violations.  The UNCHR targeting and severity of punishment variables drew from 
Lebovic and Voeten’s work (as cited in Krain, 2012), where targeting entailed the 
UNCHR investigating a state in a given year and punishment severity ranged from the 
organization taking no action to moderate sanctions to declaring a formal resolution 
denouncing the state.  His dependent variable was a severity of punishment scale that was 
an eleven-point ordinal scale of approximate conflict deaths in a state each year, and 
control variables included a conflict’s size and duration, state failures, coups, regime 
makeup, the economy, population, Cold War effects, and third party interventions.  
Applying an ordered logit analysis, he found that as UNCHR targeting (b = -.66, p < .05), 
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media articles (b = -.36, p < .01), the severity of UNCHR punishment (b = -.17, p < .05), 
and Amnesty reports (b = -.06, p < .01) increased, the severity of genocides and 
politicides significantly decreased.  Thus, UNCHR targeting and media had the strongest 
effect in decreasing political violence, contradicting earlier findings on the limited impact 
of independent shaming efforts.   
 Ruggeri and Burgoon (2012) noted the contradictory results in earlier shaming 
research citing problems with endogeneity and methodologies.  (Endogeneity referred to 
bias that occurred when it appeared that shaming contributed to raising violence levels 
when in reality further violence drove shaming efforts.)  Their study utilized Amnesty 
press releases, Newsweek and The Economist articles, and UNCHR resolutions as 
independent variables.  Amnesty, Newsweek, and The Economist shaming borrowed from 
Ramos, Ron, and Thoms’s work (as cited in Ruggeri & Burgoon, 2012) with Amnesty 
shaming capturing the total press releases on human rights abuses published on a state in 
a year and media shaming including the mean amount of human rights stories per state in 
a year.  UNCHR shaming employed Lebovic and Voeten’s model (as cited in Ruggeri & 
Burgoon, 2012) that identified if a state in a specified year was subject to a UN resolution 
for human rights abuses.  The dependent variables were conflict-related deaths, which 
included fighter and civilian casualties directly resulting from combat, and civilian deaths 
by state or rebel groups.  Control variables included government structure, population, 
Cold War effects, and conflict duration.  Applying a negative binomial regression, they 
found as media releases increased, conflict deaths significantly decreased (b = -.16, p < 
.05).  Yet, as UNCHR and Amnesty press shaming increased, civilian deaths by state 
forces significantly increased (UNCHR b = 1.96, p < .01; Amnesty b = .15, p < .01).  
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However, in using an instrumental variables approach, they found increases in UNCHR 
resolutions significantly decreased the likelihood of civilian deaths by rebel groups (b = -
1.60, p < .01) and conflict deaths (b = -1.23, p < .05).  The authors concluded that 
existing tests did not account for endogeneity and that studies need more detailed, time-
specific data to assess shaming efforts.    
The studies demonstrated that the impact of shaming on reducing states and 
ANSAs’ violent behavior remains unclear, although UN shaming resulted in some 
success.  This finding related to the current study, because some NGOs advocate for the 
UN to take action against the opposition for its civilian targeting.  Yet, shaming is only 
one persuasive technique.  The study explored multiple ways NGOs use persuasive 
communication to influence the opposition’s practice of civilian targeting.  
Source effects.  Some studies noted the differing effects of source authority and 
likeability in contexts that related to the current study.  Ghanem, Kalliny, and Elgoul 
(2012) investigated Arab Internet communication assessing a range of cultural 
tendencies, which included findings on power distance.  Power distance referred to 
measures of deference to authority, disapproval of authority, and a general power 
distance score with higher scores indicating a tendency to defer to individuals holding 
authority.  The researchers performed a content analysis of 1,081 online responses to six 
Al Arabiya articles in March 2009.  The findings related to power distance revealed that 
8.8% of posts demonstrated little deference to authority, 2.3% high deference, and 88.9% 
were not applicable; 9.2% of posts voiced disapproval of local leadership, 3.2% voiced 
approval, and 87.6% were not applicable; and 9.3% of posts reflected low power 
distance, 2.5% reflected high power distance, and 88.2% were not applicable.  The 
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statistics were small but indicated that responses were more likely to portray anti-
authority than deferential views.  Given that the current study also focuses on an Arab 
audience, the results implied that the opposition may disregard authority figures and 
therefore discount messages from these sources.  
A different study explored how transnational sources impacted individuals’ 
beliefs towards international and domestic policy issues (Dragojlovic, 2013).   The 
method involved a quasi-experimental design where 177 Canadian university students 
completed Internet surveys.  Respondents in the control group received cues from 
unspecified advocates about raising funding for foreign aid (international issue) or 
welfare (domestic issue), while the experimental group received cues from Britain’s 
Prime Minister David Cameron about raising funds for these issues.  The independent 
variables consisted of source positivity and issue awareness.  Source positivity reflected 
respondents’ approval or disapproval of Cameron, confidence in Cameron’s decisions in 
Afghanistan, and approval or disapproval of the United Kingdom; issue awareness was a 
combination of respondents’ proclivity to keep up on the news and the frequency they 
saw Cameron in the press.  The dependent variable was respondents’ support for 
additional funding for foreign aid or welfare.  Support entailed agreeing that Canada’s 
funding for these issues should increase, decrease, or remain the status quo.  The 
researcher found that the Cameron cue, if occurring with positive impressions of 
Cameron and either the welfare or foreign policy issue, increased the likelihood that 
respondents favored additional funding for these policies (b = 5.09, p < .05).  The results 
also indicated that when source positivity reached its peak, support for increasing funding 
for welfare increased by 50%; yet, negative views of Cameron decreased support for 
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increasing funding for welfare by 50%.  These findings revealed that positive attitudes 
towards an international source contributed to respondents adopting the source’s 
domestic policy position.  Given that the opposition most likely views civilian targeting 
as a domestic issue, the results implied that the opposition may adopt policies on civilian 
targeting that are advocated by transnational sources they view positively.  
The studies related to source effects highlighted that some Arab audiences 
demonstrated a disregard for authority, while a positively regarded transnational source 
among Canadian participants contributed to increased support for a domestic policy.  It is 
unclear how the opposition views sources of authority and if source likeability can 
positively influence their behavior towards civilians.  The current study examined how 
NGOs are employing source principles, such as authority and likeability, in their 
persuasive messaging.   
Armed groups and commitments.  The literature on ANSAs and commitments 
was broad and showed that both external and internal commitments positively impacted 
ANSAs’ violent behavior.  External commitments were obligations ANSAs made 
regarding a specific behavior to other parties, where internal commitments represented 
the dedication of group members to their group’s beliefs and behaviors or norms and 
leaders’ enforcement of these norms.  One study addressing external commitments 
explored how biased and unbiased mediators contributed to ANSAs and states’ 
commitments to peace in conflicts from 1989 to 2003 in 206 conflict situations 
(Svensson, 2007).  The researcher utilized biased state mediators, biased ANSA 
mediators, and non-biased mediators as the independent variables.  Biased mediators 
were parties that delivered visible assistance, such as arms, to the state or ANSA; non-
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biased mediators did not offer assistance to either side but had interests in the outcomes.  
The dependent variable was peace treaties, which were measured by identifying the year 
following treaties between state and ANSAs, where conflict deaths were below 25.  The 
control variables were the length of the conflict, conflict issue, level of violence, number 
of ANSAs, size of the state’s forces, GDP, state’s governmental structure, and time since 
previous treaties.  The researcher carried out a probit estimate and found that non-biased 
mediators (b = .71, p < .01) and biased state mediators (b = .60, p < .01) significantly 
contributed to groups committing to peace, while biased ANSAs mediators (b = .07, n.s.) 
had no significant impact on peace commitments.  Also, when the researcher kept the 
other independent variables at their means, biased state mediators (b = 1.21, p < .01) and 
non-biased mediators (b = .78, p < .01) still significantly improved ANSAs’ peace 
commitments, yet in this case state mediators had a stronger effect on commitments.   
Nilsson (2008) also investigated ANSAs’ commitments to peace treaties but 
researched how excluding other ANSAs in treaties impacted ANSAs’ commitments.  The 
researcher used the Uppsala Conflict Data Program to examine 40 intrastate conflicts 
between 1989 and 2004; each conflict included a minimum of one peace treaty.  One 
aspect of the study contained the following independent variables: excluded ANSAs, 
included ANSAs with agreements that excluded other ANSAs, and included ANSAs 
where excluded ANSAs waged violence on the state.  (The term excluded signified 
ANSAs that did not participate in a peace treaty, while the term included referred to 
ANSAs that participated in a peace treaty.)  The dependent variable was the dyadic peace 
duration, which represented if violence occurred between the specific included or 
excluded ANSA and the state since the peace treaty.  The control variables were total 
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actors per conflict, length of time since the first year 25 deaths occurred in the conflict 
between included or excluded ANSAs and the state, strength of the conflict, nature of the 
conflict dispute, existence of UN troops, existence of other peacekeeping troops, and 
treaties containing power distribution.  The researcher conducted a Cox proportional 
hazards regression and found that excluded ANSAs were more likely to wage conflict 
with the state (RR = 2.00, p < .01).   Also, there was no relationship between included 
ANSAs with agreements that excluded other ANSAs and conflict with the state (RR = 
1.14, p = n.s.); included ANSAs where excluded groups waged violence were also 
unlikely to wage violence on the state (RR = 1.05, p = n.s.).  The results suggested that 
ANSAs that committed to external treaties were unlikely to participate in violence, 
regardless of other ANSAs’ violent behavior.  It implied that gaining commitments from 
opposition groups regarding pledges to end their civilian targeting could contribute to 
reducing their civilian targeting regardless of other groups’ civilian targeting practices. 
 Other literature investigated how groups’ internal commitments influenced their 
violent behavior, specifically civilian targeting.  Haer (2012) explored the relationships 
between group characteristics of ANSAs, including members’ commitment levels, and 
civilian harm in 71 ANSAs from 1989-2010.  The independent variables encompassed 
greed, which included monetary motivations of recruits and members; grievance, which 
consisted of economic, ethnic, political, or religious disgruntlement; social cohesiveness 
of the group; and the degree of hierarchy and commitment within the group.  The 
commitment variable comprised the voluntary or forced nature of members’ recruitment; 
members’ ability to quit; members’ ability to retain external contacts; and factors related 
to loyalty, pride, and fate.  The dependent variable, drawn from the Uppsala Conflict 
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Data Program, was civilian deaths caused by ANSAs between 1989 and 2010; the control 
variables included a group’s size, group’s age, amount of other ANSAs present, conflict 
casualties, and population.   The method entailed a Bayesian ordered probit, and the 
results indicated there was no significant relationship between the level of commitment 
among ANSAs members and civilian deaths (b = -.04, p = n.s.).  Yet, when accounting 
for the control variables, increased commitments among group members decreased the 
likelihood of civilian deaths (b = -.15, the author did not provide the p value).  This 
finding suggested that under certain conditions ANSAs with dedicated members were 
less likely to engage in civilian targeting. 
Manekin (2013) found similar results in his study, which investigated how group 
characteristics of Israeli combat units contributed to unauthorized civilian targeting.  
Independent variables consisted of length of deployment around civilians; revenge, which 
was a measure of fighter and civilian deaths; morale; and command discipline, which 
included leadership authority, obedience to rules, and punishments for targeting civilians.  
Leadership authority involved leaders’ ability to enforce the rules with higher ranking 
soldiers, obedience to rules entailed the degree that internal codes of conduct were 
implemented, while punishment represented four outcomes for targeting civilians ranging 
from no punishment to imprisonment.  The dependent variable was an additive score of 
civilian targeting that comprised physical and verbal harm, damage of civilian objects, 
and capturing civilian property.  Lastly, the control variables were participants’ rank and 
service in Special Forces units.  The researcher carried out Internet surveys, and the final 
sample comprised 118 former Israeli soldiers, who served between 1999 and 2006 in 
various units.  The findings demonstrated that leadership authority (b = -.30, p < .001), 
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obedience to rules (b = -.27, p < .05), and punishments for targeting civilians (b = -.57, p 
< .001) had negative relationships with civilian targeting.  These results indicated that as 
these command discipline characteristics increased civilian targeting decreased.  Also, a 
standard ordinary least squares regression showed that leadership authority significantly 
contributed to decreased civilian targeting when excluding the variable punishment for 
targeting civilians (b = -.14, p < .01) and when including the same variable (b = -.13, p < 
.05).  Obedience to rules significantly contributed to decreased civilian targeting when 
excluding the variable punishment for targeting civilians (b = -.27, p < .01).  The findings 
signified that strong leaders, in a variety of conditions, and units that implemented rules, 
under certain conditions, were less likely to carry out unauthorized civilian targeting.  
Although the sample was a state and not an ANSA, the study offered takeaways for the 
current study.  Opposition units with effective leaders and disciplined members may be 
less likely to engage in civilian targeting.    
 The outlined studies demonstrated how ANSAs’ external commitments to peace 
treaties reduced the likelihood that they reengaged in violence despite other ANSAs’ 
violent behaviors, and ANSAs were more likely to commit to peace treaties when non-
biased or state-biased mediators were involved in the process.  Also, internal 
commitments of state and ANSAs’ members to comply with group norms contributed to 
decreasing civilian targeting.  The current study expanded upon this research by 
examining how NGOs are obtaining commitments from the opposition regarding ceasing 
civilian targeting.    
The findings from these studies revealed valuable insights for the current study.  
First, Syrian information sources included Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, BBC, family, friends, 
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Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and political blogs.  Second, strong religious, sectarian, or 
ethnic in-group identities negatively influenced attitudes towards relevant out-groups.  
Next, while there were some contradictory findings regarding shaming efforts of ANSAs, 
several studies found UN shaming to be effective.  Also, likeability of international 
sources increased the probability of support for a domestic policy, while respect for 
authority was low in a study of Arab audiences.  The commitment research showed that 
ANSAs were more likely to commit to treaties when negotiations included non-biased or 
state-biased mediators; ANSAs, who participated in peace treaties, were unlikely to 
reengage in conflict.  Finally, internal commitments to group norms increased the 
likelihood of civilian protection. This study expanded upon the research exploring how 
NGOs are using persuasion to change attitudes and behaviors within the opposition 
towards civilian targeting by addressing the following research questions: 
RQ1:  How are NGOs disseminating messages to the Syrian opposition and 
international actors regarding the need for the opposition to cease killing and 
harming civilians?   
RQ2:  What types of attitudes are NGOs trying to change within the Syrian 
opposition related to ceasing the killing and harming civilians? 
RQ3:  What kinds of persuasive techniques are NGOs using and suggesting that 
international actors employ in encouraging the Syrian opposition to cease killing 
and harming civilians?  




I utilized the case study method for the study.  The case study is a qualitative 
method, which offers an in-depth examination of an individual, group, organization, 
occurrence, or process (Stacks, 2011).   One strength of the case study is that it enables 
researchers to explore the context of the issue under examination, which offers an 
opportunity to identify lessons learned from decisions and events (Stacks, 2011; Yin, 
2009).  The case study, like other qualitative methods, also provides depth on a topic.  
Yet, it can offer the most comprehensive understanding of an issue, because its findings 
draw upon data from multiple methods (Stacks, 2011).  Alternatively, one weakness of 
the case study is that the results cannot be generalized to the population.  Case studies 
also cannot determine causality; however, they can build on findings from experiments 
and identify why an effect occurred (Yin, 2009).   
The case study was an appropriate method for this study, because the topic 
entailed an in-depth investigation of two NGOs’ processes for persuading the opposition 
to cease killing and harming civilians.  One of the NGOs is based in Switzerland (referred 
to as the Swiss NGO) and is very active in engaging ANSAs, including the opposition, 
throughout the Middle East.  The other NGO is a U.S. based entity (referred to as the 
U.S. NGO) with a regional presence in the Middle East, and its work includes messaging 
the opposition and conveying recommendations to international bodies and states about 
ways to stop the opposition’s practice of civilian targeting.  The approach entailed data 
collection via the following two qualitative methods: (a) in-depth interviews with NGO 
staff and a training partner and (b) a qualitative content analysis of materials used to 
convey messages to the opposition and other relevant actors about civilian targeting as 
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well as materials from the opposition in response to NGOs’ messaging efforts.  It 
produced a rich understanding of the topic and the opportunity to identify best practices 
for engaging similar ANSAs about civilian targeting.  
Data Sources 
Artifact selection.  The two NGOs under investigation had different persuasive 
approaches with the opposition; therefore, the qualitative content analysis examined 
different materials from each organization.  The Swiss NGO utilized various approaches 
for engaging the opposition about the need to cease killing and harming civilians.  It 
directly reached out to opposition groups through meetings and in-person training 
sessions.  Additionally, it reached out to the wider opposition by creating and 
disseminating videos and booklets about ceasing civilian targeting.  For the Swiss NGO 
portion of the study, I collected a census of campaign videos, which in part targeted the 
opposition; an English version of the training booklet, which was similar to the Arabic 
training booklet that was disseminated to the opposition; English training modules, which 
were similar to Arabic training modules used with the opposition; a 2012 conference 
report on the broader topic; a 2014-2016 Swiss NGO strategy document; and a census of 
opposition authored code of conduct documents.   I collected and analyzed the English 
versions of training documents due to language capabilities.    
The U.S. NGO directly engaged the opposition about the need to cease killing and 
harming civilians via methods such as press releases, reports, letters, and Twitter feeds.  
However, the organization also messaged other international actors, such as states, on 
ways they could encourage the opposition to cease civilian targeting. I collected and 
analyzed messages directly intended for the opposition and for other actors, who the U.S. 
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NGO viewed as having influence with the opposition.  For the U.S. NGO portion of the 
study, I collected a simple random sample of press releases on the topic, a census of 
reports on the topic, and a census of letters between the NGO and the opposition and 
from the NGO to international bodies regarding the opposition’s practice of civilian 
targeting.   
Although the materials differed, I applied the same inclusion and exclusion 
criteria.  The conflict began in March 2011, but I only included materials from January 1, 
2012 – June 30, 2014.  I excluded materials from 2011, because the opposition was in its 
early stages of development, and the state was the primary perpetrator of civilian 
targeting.  Also, I included any materials that addressed (a) preventing civilian targeting, 
(b) preventing the targeting of civilian property, (c) prohibiting unlawful weapons, (d) 
treating the wounded and dead, (e) respecting prisoners’ rights, (f) preventing civilian 
displacement, and (g) protecting humanitarian and medical relief.  I included these 
specific issues as part of civilian targeting, because one of the Swiss NGO’s training 
documents presented these issues in ways that related to civilian harm.  Additionally, I 
included material on civilian targeting intended for the opposition or for all armed actors 
in Syria.  This approach allowed me to assess the NGOs’ messaging directed at the 
opposition and to compare differences between tailored and broad messaging.  Lastly, I 
analyzed the text in all the materials but only analyzed the graphics in the campaign 
videos, training booklets, and training modules. 
Alternatively, I excluded materials about respecting civilian property, respecting 
women, and protecting children.  In other contexts, the Swiss NGO addressed the 
protection of women and children as independent behavior changes.  Also, my study’s 
                        
 
 28 
focus was about reaching the opposition about the protection of civilians in general, 
whereas women and children represent unique populations.  For these reasons, I excluded 
materials about these specific populations.  Lastly, the Swiss NGO differentiated between 
targeting and respecting civilian property.  Targeting involved attacking civilian property, 
whereas respecting entailed not taking civilian property.  I included the former because 
the result could kill or harm civilians.  However, I excluded materials about respecting 
civilian property, because it did not present immediate harm to civilians.  
 I retrieved all the materials from each organization’s website except the Swiss 
NGO’s campaign videos, which came from YouTube and a Facebook page for the 
campaign.  Thus, all materials are publicly available.  All but two of the Swiss NGO 
materials were stand-alone documents.  The exceptions were the campaign videos and the 
opposition authored documents.  There were a total of seven videos, but I only analyzed 
the videos that met the aforementioned inclusion and exclusion criteria producing a 
census of six videos.  Additionally, there were five opposition authored documents; after 
reviewing them to see if they met the criteria, I had a final census of two documents.  For 
collecting a simple random sample of press releases from the U.S. NGO, I took the 
following steps.  I first pulled up the list of press releases on Syria from 2012; 2013; and 
January 1, 2014 through June 30, 2014.  I then read each press release summary to 
determine if it met the inclusion criteria.  If I was unsure if it met the criteria, I read the 
full text.  I noted any press releases that fell within the criteria, and this list included 38 
press releases and composed my sampling frame.  I then entered the press release titles 
into an Excel spreadsheet and used Excel to generate an automatic simple random sample 
of 15 press releases.  I applied a similar approach in obtaining my census of reports and 
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letters from the U.S. NGO.  I retrieved reports and letters regarding Syria in the 
determined timeframe.  My initial search of reports produced 11 results.  After reading 
the summary of each report to determine if it met the inclusion criteria, I had a census of 
three reports.  My initial search of letters produced 12 results; after reviewing the 
summaries and applying my inclusion criteria, my census included seven letters.  Lastly, I 
included a census of three letters from the opposition to the U.S. NGO regarding civilian 
targeting.  
 Participant recruitment.  For both NGOs, I applied a snowball sampling 
technique to recruit participants for the in-depth interviews.  The interview participants 
from the Swiss NGO included program and communication staff who have worked the 
Syria account, and a trainer partner, who has engaged the opposition about civilian 
targeting.  The interview participant from the U.S. NGO was a senior researcher from its 
Middle East based office, who works the Syria account.  I had a total of four interview 
participants. 
 I recruited my participants by sending them an email invitation to participate in 
the study (see Appendix A).  The invitation explained the study’s focus, that participants’ 
names would not be connected to their answers, and the basic format of the interview.     
Data Procedures 
The study investigated three primary constructs: NGOs’ dissemination methods 
for reaching the opposition about civilian targeting, attitudes within the opposition 
towards civilians, and persuasive techniques for encouraging the opposition to cease 
civilian targeting.  I addressed the first research question by asking about preferred 
channels for conveying messages.  I addressed the second research question regarding 
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attitudes within the opposition by asking about positive and negative views the opposition 
has of civilians, including civilians who support the regime and civilians with differing 
sectarian, ethnic, and national identities.  I defined sectarian identity as an individual’s 
self-perception based on his/her actual or perceived membership in a religious sect.  
Next, I defined ethnic identity as an individual’s self-perception based on his/her actual 
or perceived membership in an ethnic group.  Finally, I defined national identity as an 
individual’s self-perception based on his/her actual or perceived membership in a state.  I 
answered the third research question regarding persuasive techniques by asking about 
compliance messages, message difficulty, source characteristics, and commitment 
strategies.  I defined compliance messages as communications that stressed ways that 
groups would punish the opposition for committing civilian targeting or reward the 
opposition for preventing civilian targeting (Stiff & Mongeau, 2003).  
 Artifact collection.  I began my data collection by saving an electronic version of 
each of my artifacts.  I coded each artifact and assigned all artifacts from a particular 
sample or census the same letter with each artifact having a unique letter number code.  
For example, I coded the videos with the letter A, and I labeled the first video A1, the 
second video A2, and so on.  I then coded the training booklet as B1 and continued this 
process until all the artifacts had codes.  I created an electronic Analysis Sheet (see 
Appendix B) for each artifact and labeled it with the artifact’s corresponding code.  I then 
read the research questions and Analysis Sheet questions, so I could review what 
information I needed to consider in examining the artifacts.  I then reviewed each artifact 
and electronically completed its Analysis Sheet.  A few weeks later, I reviewed the 
artifacts a second time to ensure that I did not miss any data.  I also inputted additional 
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relevant observations of the artifacts that were not addressed by the Analysis Sheet 
questions.  
 Interview procedures.  Once I received Homewood Institutional Review Board 
(HIRB) approval, I contacted the interview participants by email to arrange a day and 
time to conduct the interviews.  The email also contained a copy of the consent form, and 
I asked participants to read it before the interview and to call or email me if they had any 
concerns or questions.  I conducted all the interviews on the Internet through Skype and 
recorded them using the software application QuickTime Player.  I began each interview 
by asking participants for their oral consent regarding their participation and for their 
permission to electronically record the discussion.  I then proceeded by following the 
Interview Guide, which addressed questions on methods for disseminating messages, 
attitudes within the opposition towards civilians, and a NGO’s persuasive messaging 
techniques for encouraging the opposition to cease civilian targeting (see Appendix C).  
Each interview lasted about one hour.  I also followed up with participants if I needed 
clarification on their responses.  Participants did not receive any incentives.  Finally, the 
interviews were transcribed. 
Data Analysis   
 I began my data analysis by creating a master Analysis Sheet for each NGO’s 
results, where I copied and pasted all of the input from the individual NGO Analysis 
Sheets.  This step organized all of the qualitative content analysis data into two 
documents and enabled me to identify themes and gaps in the data.  Themes are trends 
that appeared within different data sets that provided insight in answering a research 
                        
 
 32 
question.  I looked for how themes offered both direct and indirect explanations for the 
research questions.   
In analyzing the interview material, I first read the interview transcripts several 
times.  I then coded the data by highlighting all the data corresponding with RQ1 in 
orange, the data corresponding with RQ2 in pink, and the data corresponding with RQ3 
in yellow.  In the margin, I noted what the data addressed, specifically channels, attitudes, 
compliance messaging, source characteristics, commitment techniques, and/or any other 
relevant material.  For example, if a response addressed commitment mechanisms a NGO 
used to influence the opposition, I highlighted the section in yellow and in the margin 
wrote “commitment techniques.”  After I coded all the transcripts, I examined the data for 
each research question to identify themes that directly or indirectly offered support for 
each question.  
Finally, I drafted a document outlining the research questions and their supporting 
themes with examples from the artifacts and interviews.   In the results section, I 
attempted to present themes based on various data sources, a technique known as 
triangulation (Yin, 2009).  This process provided context and improved the validity of the 
findings.  I also presented results that drew from only a single type of data source if key 
themes were unavailable in multiple sources and pointed to contradictions in the data.  I 
supported each theme with descriptions and quotes from the artifacts and transcripts.  
Note that if English was not the first language of an interview participant, quotes may 
reflect grammatical errors that were not corrected in order to preserve the meaning of the 
discussion.  
  





 The Swiss NGO is headquartered in Switzerland but carries out its mission 
globally, including the Middle East.  The organization focuses on engaging armed non-
state actors (ANSAs) in efforts to shape their behavior towards civilians.  The Swiss 
NGO has been very involved in directly and indirectly engaging facets of the Syrian 
opposition about ceasing civilian targeting.  Their staff members and training partners 
have conducted media campaigns, meetings, and trainings in attempts to positively 
influence the opposition’s behavior towards civilians.  The results drew from their input 
and the analysis of campaign videos, training booklets, training modules, a conference 
report on the broader issue, a strategy document, and opposition authored conduct 
documents.  
RQ1: How Are NGOs Disseminating Messages to the Syrian Opposition and 
International Actors Regarding the Need for the Opposition to Cease Killing and 
Harming Civilians? 
In-person exchanges.  One of the main channels the Swiss NGO utilized in 
reaching the opposition about the need to cease civilian targeting was through in-person 
exchanges, notably meetings and training sessions.  During training sessions, trainers 
leveraged numerous other means to convey messages including presentation materials, 
videos, and games.  A Swiss NGO staff member commented, “The direct engagement 
which is meetings and discussing the policies of the ANSAs and then trainings.  This is 
our main means of putting out or disseminating the message.”  Another Swiss NGO staff 
member elaborated on how training sessions enabled the organization to delve deeper on 
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message content noting, “Then during the trainings that we organize for them, of course 
we use the PowerPoint presentation where we’d maybe detail a bit more on the different 
rules [regarding civilian targeting].”  He later further elaborated on how certain means, 
such as the videos, present messages such as “Do not attack medical facilities” in a 
simple format, but the reality on the ground can be more complicated because the enemy 
may position fighters in a hospital.  He noted that trainings allow trainers to further 
explain concepts and rules and enable opposition members the opportunity to ask 
questions.  Perhaps, the most illuminating response came from the Swiss NGO’s trainer’s 
description of how games are an effective means for delivering messages.  He provided 
the following example: 
We ask people to play the role of an officer at an airport and somebody as an 
attorney or with masters or with PhD abroad and then all of a sudden this person 
is recognized by this officer as a wanted person or whatever.  When this person is 
stopped at the airport he’s questioned: “Where are you going?” “Why are you 
doing this?” “You know you’ve been part of some accusations and your name has 
been mentioned, your photograph is listed in here” and he’s taken to custody.  He 
said, “No, it’s not me.  It’s my commander.”  This commander’s name is 
mentioned.  The commander is not there but they say, “You are responsible for 
this.  It’s individual responsibility.”  This is [what people don’t] understand 
what’s the meaning of individual responsibility but we mention it…because this is 
part of the implementation of the law.  And this person is not capable of reaching 
his destination.  His future is done because he’s arrested for allegedly committing 
war crimes.  This is a role play.  Usually, this is done with a selection of two or 
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three of the people who are showing signs of accepting and understanding more 
than others.   
The trainer later described how sometimes opposition members are initially reserved in 
the beginning of training sessions, and so he relies on games to help engage and motivate 
them.  He explained the positive effect games elicit noting, “I have never seen anyone 
who refrained or said no including old religious leaders like 65 years old who played and 
ran and took active participation as they played and they closed their eyes, everything.”  
Thus, role playing and other games were effective channels for not only disseminating 
messages regarding civilian targeting but for enabling opposition members to participate 
in conveying and learning about the rules of conflict.  
 Videos.  Another channel the Swiss NGO leveraged to disseminate messages was 
their video campaign that utilized media and social media and offered a means for 
reaching across the opposition and to wider Syrian audiences.  A Swiss NGO staff 
member commented on the video campaign saying, “Media in general especially in our 
campaign [Swiss NGO’s Syria campaign], it was a media campaign mainly.  Now, we 
are working to enhance it and to develop it more and more.”  A different Swiss NGO 
staff member elaborated on the video campaign and its effectiveness: 
The problem with Syria is that the opposition groups are not very well-structured.  
They have a lot of different units with a very weak command chain and so it’s 
very difficult to engage….the idea was to have a different approach because of 
that and to try more mass media targeting not only the armed groups but also 
different kinds of militants and activists and people that’s having contact with the 
groups… .  
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The most telling sign that the videos reached the opposition was that opposition 
groups further distributed the videos through their own channels.  A Swiss NGO staff 
member explained, “On, their website, they also posted the videos on their Facebook and 
Twitter accounts which are followed by…people.…[T]hey were also broadcasted on 
many local opposition TV and also in Al Arabiya, which is one of the main Arabic TV… 
.” 
 Booklets.  The Swiss NGO also relied on booklets for disseminating messages 
regarding the need to cease civilian targeting.  The organization discussed how booklets 
are an effective way for reaching fighters on the ground.   A Swiss NGO staff member 
remarked, “For the fighters, the best mean is the booklet….[I]t’s really direct engagement 
to the fighter himself because it’s very easy.  He can just look at the drawings and 
understand what the message is.”  The Swiss NGO trainer offered a similar comment 
stating, “We give them some materials also like a…brochure….Some of the drawings we 
give them… .”  Another Swiss NGO staff member stated, “So many of the booklets.  
They were sent to Syria and also distributed to the opposition groups.”  
Mobile apps.  Lastly, a Swiss NGO staff member described how the organization 
is developing new channels, including mobile apps and card games, to deliver messages 
explaining: 
We are also planning to launch a mobile app, which is almost ready….[T]he app 
basically has different scenarios….[E]ach scenario is composed of three different 
questions….The idea is to have it as a game, not as a boring quiz….In the game, 
the user is put in a situation.  Let’s say they are at the checkpoint and a truck is 
coming.  So, the first question is, “Can you stop the truck?”  Then, “Yes,” 
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“no.”…Then, “Can you inspect the truck and can you confiscate the material in 
the truck?”....You have to insert “yes” or “no” every time.  We try through these 
different situations to show again to explain the international humanitarian law 
and maybe more details than in the booklet and in the videos because we have 
more time and space.  [International humanitarian law (IHL) is often referenced 
by interview participants and relates to laws that protect civilians during armed 
conflict.]   
The example demonstrated how the Swiss NGO continues to creatively expand its 
channels for disseminating messages to the opposition about ceasing civilian targeting.   
Low message complexity.  In utilizing the aforementioned channels for 
messaging the opposition, the Swiss NGO primarily created and disseminated simple 
messages around civilian targeting.  These channels and their simple messages made for 
low complexity in the overall message presentation and enabled the Swiss NGO to reach 
multiple facets and tiers of the opposition as well as the wider Syrian community.  The 
simplicity came across in straightforward, brief audio and visual messages depicting how 
fighters should treat civilians.  Training booklets demonstrated this simple design where 
each page contained a few phrases outlining the messages and one or two images 
illustrating the concept (“Fifteen key rules,” 2014).  For example, one page stated, 
“Respect medical personnel, hospitals and ambulances.  Do not misuse protective 
symbols such as the Red Cross or Red Crescent.”  One image showed a fighter allowing 
medical personnel to move through a street with a green check in the upper left corner.  
The other image depicted fighters painting the symbol of the Red Cross on their armed 
truck with a red X in the upper left corner.  The images and text conveyed in a basic 
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format that the first behavior was acceptable and the second behavior was unacceptable.  
Separately, a Swiss NGO staff member, in discussing the campaign videos, highlighted, 
“The idea was really to create messages that are very straightforward, very simple, and 
very efficient.  Basically, we decided to have only one message per video, one very 
simple message per video that everybody could understand.”  He later attributed some of 
the success of the campaign videos to their short duration noting, “Also, probably the 
length.…It’s not a 10 minute video.  We explained a bit for almost 30 seconds.”  A 
different Swiss NGO staff member also commented on the organization’s simplistic 
approach mentioning, “We tried to prioritize all these articles and texts of these laws, 
international humanitarian law and human rights, in 15 main rules which are the 
minimum standards of any combatant that have to comply with.” 
Another attribute of many of the Swiss NGO’s messages that contributed to their 
low message complexity was their captivating appeal.  The campaign videos especially 
had a captivating quality, which enhanced the messaging and broadened their reach.  For 
example, one video regarding the need to respect prisoners’ rights depicted the illustrator 
drawing a prisoner sitting in his cell (Syria IHL, 2013).  A pair of shackles appeared over 
the prisoner’s feet accompanied by a sound effect of chains, and then the illustrator 
quickly moved the shackles off the page.  The introduction of the word fighter had a 
dramatic effect where the word appeared to fall on the screen superimposed over the 
drawing of the prisoner.  Simultaneously, a loud stamping sound accompanied the 
introduction of the word further emphasizing the appeal of being labeled a fighter.  This 
combination of visual and audio effects bolstered the video’s appeal.  A Swiss NGO staff 
member commented on the video’s appeal noting: 
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It was a raising awareness campaign and it was very welcomed from 
everybody….[W]e’re using it as one of our entering strategies for some ANSAs 
because it doesn’t contradict with any of their principles or beliefs….[I]t’s very 
attractive.  It depends on drawings.  It depends on motion. 
A different Swiss NGO staff member also addressed the appeal of the videos’ design 
commenting:  
We just wanted to have a very for a TV spot something very acting and very 
forward.  That’s something that even children could see and understand.  I mean 
the cartoon drawings, I think they’re very attracting….I mean the cartoons which 
are more designed for children and the rules which are talking about the war 
crimes, humanitarian law and so makes a very interesting combination. 
RQ2:  What Types of Attitudes Are NGOs Trying to Change within the Syrian 
Opposition Related to Ceasing the Killing and Harming Civilians? 
Negative attitudes towards Alawites.  The Swiss NGO reported that the 
opposition does not directly express negative views towards the general civilian 
population, but the opposition’s statements and behaviors demonstrate harmful attitudes 
towards civilian sub-groups with perceived connections to the regime.  It explained these 
perceived regime connections lead the opposition to view civilian sub-groups as 
responsible for regime abuses where the opposition then does not draw a distinction 
between civilians and regime fighters.  The Swiss NGO explained that this drives the 
hostile attitudes towards these civilian sub-groups, which is reflected by the opposition’s 
practices of killing, harming, or using these civilians as bargaining chips against the 
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regime.  One of the primary sub-groups identified was the Alawite community, who often 
are targeted by the opposition.  A Swiss NGO staff member explained: 
We didn’t work with people who are adopting such policy or such attitude but in 
practice…when we have the discussions with them, many times we go through 
some expressions that they use in discriminating the villages, for example when 
we attacked this Alawite village….Even in the expressions, you can feel 
that…even if it’s not adopted, this is not a policy but at some point, we are 
somehow sure that many of their fighters…have this attitude and have this 
motivation even for going through this war. 
A trainer from the Swiss NGO confirmed that the opposition negatively views Alawites 
and believed that some opposition groups deliberately seek to harm this group of 
civilians.  The trainer remarked:  
I did not see a direct intentional…of these groups to attack the civilian 
population…unless it came to certain category of Syrian population, the Alawites 
who are close to…President Assad…where these people [opposition members] 
have indicated that because these people [the Alawites] have tortured us….We 
will cause them harm…we will intentionally harm them, we will keep their 
women as captive and whatever… . 
He further elaborated on how opposition groups draw a connection between the regime 
and Syrian Alawites and how this leads to hostile views towards this religious sectarian 
community noting:  
They are intentionally purposefully wanting to cause harm to this sub-
group….They know that these are civilians but this is one of the mercy systems of 
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harming the regime by attacking these Alawites.…[B]y arresting or by taking 
hostages of the Alawites, the soldiers are trying to use some kind of hostage 
situation…try to initiate an exchange where they call the mediators or even the 
government in Syrian regime if they wish to have these people back… . 
Negative attitudes towards regime supporters.  The Swiss NGO also identified 
that the opposition holds hostile views towards actual or perceived regime supporters 
who are so closely associated with the regime that their civilian status is overlooked.  A 
Swiss NGO staff member explained the challenge in getting opposition members to 
acknowledge that there are civilians on all sides of the conflict stating: 
The main difficulty is not to convince but to make those people understand…at 
some point that civilians are not only your civilians.  Civilians are from the other 
side too.  At some point, they can’t recognize this issue…not all of them 
because…they’re trying to defend themselves… .   
He later described how often the opposition does not distinguish between pro-regime 
civilians and regime fighters noting:  
This is the main difficulty to make them understand that there is a huge difference 
between participation and hostilities and supporting through political situation or 
political point of view.  This is very problematic and very difficult….So they have 
this privilege to use or invest in the reality that there’s an enemy [the regime] and 
we can minimize the power of this enemy by targeting the activists who are for 
example supporting financially media or whatever, but finally at the end, they are 
civilians. 
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RQ3: What Kinds of Persuasive Techniques Are NGOs Using and Suggesting that 
International Actors Employ in Encouraging the Syrian Opposition to Cease Killing 
and Harming Civilians? 
Relevancy of international rules.   The Swiss NGO conveyed that it tailors its 
messaging to opposition groups based on the values they place on issues such as 
international legitimacy and Islamic rules.  In reaching more moderate Islamic or secular 
opposition groups, the Swiss NGO primarily framed its messaging to emphasize 
international legitimacy and accountability, which are issues these groups deem 
important.  The Swiss NGO staff member commented:  
We’re dealing very closely with the Kurds in Syria….We don’t even mention 
anything about the congruence of Islamic rules and the IHL.  The main focus 
there is about women for example because they are really interested in this 
fighting discrimination and giving the women their rights….For other groups, 
they are just caring about IHL, about accountability, about criminal justice and 
what will happen…they have a lot of questions for us about their behavior and 
their practices during war….How is it interpreted in IHL?  Are we violators or 
not?  They are really concerned about the image in the international community 
and they try to comply with IHL.   
Even though the aforementioned example highlighted the protection of women, 
which is a civilian sub-group outside the scope of this study, it demonstrated how the 
Swiss NGO tailors messaging to specific opposition audiences.  The Swiss trainer also 
provided a similar example stating, “A group that is not so religious...not fundamental but 
still religious I don’t articulate a lot on the religious factors but I [talk] the law.” 
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Compliance with international rules.  In presenting messages about 
international legitimacy and accountability, the Swiss NGO mainly conveyed that the 
opposition needs to cease civilian targeting because it has a responsibility to comply with 
the rules of conflict, specifically IHL.  One Swiss NGO staff member explained, “The 
core content of our messaging is the international humanitarian law.  In such complex 
situations like in Syria…it’s better to use the international humanitarian norms which is a 
combination between human rights and IHL, the international humanitarian law.”  
Another Swiss NGO staff member confirmed this compliance themed approach stating, 
“All the messages came from the international humanitarian law and are familiar with all 
these treaties and conventions… .”  Additionally, a campaign video portrayed the need 
for combatants not to target civilian objects (Syria IHL, 2013).  (Civilian objects are 
civilian infrastructure or non-military infrastructure such as hospitals, mosques, or 
markets.) The narrator in the video stated, “In times of war, not everything is allowed.  
Do not target or attack civilian objects or public properties.  War has rules too.”  
Simultaneously, an illustrator drew a residential scene including homes and a mosque, 
while a target emblem kept appearing over the residential buildings.  Each time the target 
appeared, the illustrator’s hand moved the target off the page, signifying that targeting 
civilian buildings is not allowed.  Thus, the audio and visual messaging directly and 
indirectly conveyed that targeting civilian objects violates rules.   
Costs for noncompliance with international rules.  The costs for non-
compliance with IHL included various consequences the opposition will endure, and one 
of the main costs was legal repercussions.  The Swiss NGO trainer explained how he 
conveys this cost stating, “If you kill civilians, if you attack civilians, this is…war crimes.  
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Let’s say that you traveled somewhere and then you are recognized.  You will be taken to 
court….[Y]ou will be held accountable… .”  Separately, a training booklet outlined that 
individuals who breach the rules will be “investigated and sanctioned” under 
international protocols (“Fifteen key rules,” 2014).  The language “sanctioned” implied 
some type of legal consequences for engaging in civilian targeting.  Also, the training 
modules presented that one of the rationales for why fighters should follow the rules was 
criminal liability (“Introduction to the,” 2012).  The message implied that fighters, who 
violate the rules, will endure criminal charges for non-compliance. 
 Another cost the Swiss NGO relayed to the opposition was that civilian targeting 
will decrease its legitimacy domestically.  A Swiss NGO staff member commented, 
“They will lose their popular support.  The ground that they’re based on, they are 
working or operating in populated areas where they are seeking for people supporting 
them and people who protect them….They will lose this.”  The Swiss NGO trainer also 
shared a similar response about what he tells the opposition stating:  
If the situation finishes and you face the situation where there will be elections to 
choose the government of a new Syria.  Do you think people will love you or like 
you when you kill civilians or you’re trying to become a leader?  Of course, this is 
not acceptable. 
A campaign video also indirectly suggested the loss of legitimacy the opposition will 
incur for civilian targeting (Swiss NGO’s Syria campaign, 2013).  The narrator made 
statements about the need to follow rules and not engage in summary executions.  The 
illustrator drew a scene of a blindfolded civilian man against a wall, and then an armed 
fighter appeared holding the civilian at gunpoint.  The illustrator’s hand moved the armed 
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fighter off the page, suggesting the behavior is unacceptable.  The video concluded with 
the words fighter and killer in Arabic with the word for no in Arabic next to the word 
killer.  The term killer was indirectly being tied to individuals committing summary 
killings and the word no signified that this was the unacceptable role.  Thus, killer was 
used as a negative label, and it was implied that this role would decrease the opposition’s 
legitimacy. 
Benefits of compliance with international rules.   The messaging approach also 
included advocating benefits or gains for following international rules regarding civilian 
targeting.  The primary benefit the Swiss NGO conveyed was that the opposition can gain 
legitimacy.  A Swiss NGO staff member commented on how this is framed stating: 
It’s about the gains and benefits of respecting IHL and respecting the Islamic rule 
but mainly we focus on IHL.  You will be the good guys.  You will be respected 
by the people.  You will have more…popular support.  You will show the 
difference between you and the opponents in this context and many other issues. 
The Swiss NGO trainer expressed a similar response noting, “If they want to satisfy the 
international community being respectful and if you would like to respect the Syrian 
population because they are innocent they have nothing to do with this.”  Separately, a 
campaign video about not targeting medical support portrayed a scene of an illustrator 
drawing a Red Cross medical personnel loading a wounded person into an ambulance 
(Syria IHL, 2013).  A targeting symbol appeared over the ambulance and the illustrator’s 
hand moved the target off the page.  The narrator conveyed, “Respect and protect medical 
personnel and objects.”  At the end of the video, the words fighter and killer appeared in 
Arabic with the Arabic word for no next to the word killer, and the narrator stated 
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“Fighter not a killer.”  The combination of visual and audio messages implied that the 
opposition can be considered legitimate fighters by protecting medical personnel. 
 Another key benefit the Swiss NGO communicated was the military gains from 
not targeting civilians.  The Swiss NGO trainer commented: 
Sometimes, you give them also what is the benefit of targeting the civilian?  You 
want to cause harm to the regime?.…When you attack a civilian, how…can you 
harm the ability or power of the regime?  It’s useless.  I’m also teaching them 
what we call it “military economics.”  
Separately, the training modules had a section on why fighters should “know” the 
rules, highlighting how it will improve their decision making in cases where they need to 
make quick judgments (“Introduction to the,” 2012).   A later section of the training 
modules then discussed why combatants should “follow” the rules and bullet points noted  
“military effectiveness” and “reciprocity.”  These two examples suggested that 
understanding and following rules governing civilian targeting could improve the 
opposition’s military capacity.  
Relevancy of religious norms.   In messaging conservative Islamic opposition 
groups, the Swiss NGO identified that these groups are not directly influenced by 
international law, so the organization primarily framed messages around Islamic law.  
The Swiss NGO trainer explained, “I’m going to present the Islam away from 
IHL…which is the international law.  They look at it as this is western civilization.  This 
is something the [west] is trying to impose on us.”  He later elaborated that in reaching 
these groups he focuses the messaging on the intersection between international law and 
Islamic law saying, “When it comes to a group like Jabhat al Nusra for example, where 
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they are taught all these Islamic...half positions we focus on the Islamic law and Sharia 
and the factor of the law.”  The Swiss NGO staff member confirmed this approach 
remarking, “For the Islamic ones they’re really interested in preserving this Islamic 
image of them.  Even in their statements…this Islamic front announced a code of honor 
for all the ANSAs…about avoiding civilians and respecting human rights.” 
Compliance with religious norms.  In conveying messages about Islamic law, 
the Swiss NGO communicated that following international rules regarding civilian 
targeting is an extension of complying with Islamic rules or norms.  A Swiss NGO trainer 
explained how he presents the relationship between complying with international and 
Islamic laws, “I present the set of law, and I try to present examples from the Sharia from 
Prophet Muhammad’s…from Qur’an….[W]e are talking same language…this is what 
Qur’an wanted, and this is exactly what IHL is asking for.”  A Swiss NGO staff member 
also addressed this approach saying, “We relied on our trainers and experts who were 
able to make this link between Islamic law and IHL.”  He later expanded on this point 
stating: 
At any point, we will face questions about, this is what IHL says about this case.  
What does Islam say?  They try always to remember or to remind that also we 
have our rules and let’s compare.  This comparison actually is very good and very 
useful for us because even we learn from it and we develop our material 
depending on it. 
Finally, training modules also reviewed the background of IHL, which included a 
reference to how Islam called for “The need to respect justice and equality as a 
fundamental principle of its humanitarian thinking” (“Introduction to the,” 2012).  This 
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tenet demonstrated a connection between IHL and Islam and implied that Islam is based 
on principles that protect civilians. 
Costs for non-compliance with religious norms.  In messaging about the need 
to follow Islamic laws regarding civilian targeting, the Swiss NGO promoted the moral 
costs for non-compliance.  The Swiss NGO trainer discussed how he presents moral costs 
noting: 
If you don’t obey IHL, actually you are violating IHL and the Sharia.  Why are 
you fighting?  To satisfy Allah, to satisfy death?  But by not respecting the 
law…by attacking these people…you are…violating both laws….[W]hen the 
judgment day comes in heaven, you will be also sent to hell. 
The Swiss NGO staff member also referenced the tactic of highlighting potential moral 
costs stating, “Violating IHL is violating Islamic rules.  For them, it’s very important and 
more important, the accountability of Islam is more important…than accountability of 
IHL.” 
Source characteristics.  One of the main aspects of the Swiss NGO’s 
organizational portrayal was its emphasis on its neutrality.  In a 2012 conference report 
on messaging ANSAs, a description of the Swiss NGO stated it adheres to “principles of 
neutrality and impartiality” (“Engaging with armed,” 2012).  A Swiss NGO staff member 
also explained:  
It is very important to convince the target group that we are neutral.  We are not 
implementing or having the agenda of the other side.  We’re not standing on the 
side of one against the other….My business is just to help you to protect the 
population that you’re dealing with or the civilians that you’re dealing with.  This 
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is very important because at the moment that you lose neutrality, we’ll lose access 
and we’ll lose the confidence that we built with the ANSAs and definitely will 
harm the objective that we’re aiming to.   
A different Swiss NGO staff member commented on how the organization disseminated 
campaign videos to both sides in the conflict in trying to depict its neutrality: 
Even if our objective is toward the armed opposition, also, to show we are neutral, 
we also sent it to the government and government agencies.  Then, we present the 
organization to the armed groups…we don’t take [sides] or that we don’t have 
political opinions at all.  We just want them to improve their behavior regarding 
the protection of civilians and that’s it.   
The Swiss NGO’s organizational portrayal was subtle within its messaging.  
Materials sometimes referenced organizational information, but only briefly in order to 
avoid creating perceptions of Western influence.  For example, in the campaign video on 
not using prohibited weapons and methods, the only organization portrayal was the 
presentation of the NGO’s logo in the final seconds of the video (Syria IHL, 2013).  The 
Swiss NGO trainer provided an explanation of how the organization maintains a limited 
presence during training sessions noting: 
So when it comes to the programs of [the NGO’s name] this is something that we 
mention.  We mention it briefly to the people that [the NGO’s name] is doing this 
for the reasons…to encourage people to adhere to the law… . 
He later elaborated, “Sometimes it’s just 15 to 20 minutes max at the beginning of the 
training but all the other materials like when we give them the brochures…we have [the 
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NGO’s name] mentioned there.”  A Swiss NGO staff member offered a separate example 
of how the organization originally omitted its logo from the campaign videos stating: 
Initially when we created them we didn’t put any logo and we didn’t…broadcast 
it generally for the public.  We created a specific YouTube page without our logo 
and without any mention of our organization because we are thinking…it was 
better to not to show too much that it’s coming from Switzerland and the western 
part because I think for many of them, they are very reluctant to get 
any…advice…from the western part. 
 Lastly, in some cases, an essential part of the Swiss NGO’s portrayal was its 
partnerships with other organizations that are deemed trustworthy by the opposition.  
These collaborations enabled the Swiss NGO to slowly build trust with opposition 
groups, who normally may be skeptical of a western organization.  One of the Swiss 
NGO staff members described how interactions with some Islamic opposition groups 
entailed this approach commenting: 
They have this sense in dealing with any foreigner, not only [the NGO’s name].  
For example, at the first meeting I remember where we met some of these, they 
completely refused to meet us alone.  It was completely forbidden.  They don’t 
trust anything.  They think that we are hiding some recorders or something like 
that.  They insisted that we have other two to three people from different 
associations…that they trust and they deal with to be present in the meeting 
despite they don’t have any role in this. 
Another Swiss NGO staff member commented on this issue remarking, “We always work 
with local partners, so people that know very well the field that they may already have 
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contacts with the opposition groups.”  He later expanded on the challenges of directly 
engaging the opposition saying: 
They don’t trust you.  That’s why we always go through a local organization 
that’s usually very close to these armed groups. The local organization…they’re 
very politically engaged with these groups usually but this is the way we come 
into contact with the groups when we start working with them.   
Some of the Swiss NGO’s materials conveyed its other partnerships, such as its training 
booklet (“Fifteen key rules,” 2014).  The back cover of the booklet had the Swiss NGO’s 
logo and contact information; the logo of one of its partners, which was another Swiss 
NGO; and the logo of one of its funders.  Although these NGOs represented western 
organizations, their association with Switzerland, which is known for its neutrality, 
implied a neutral, united portrayal.  
Strategies for gaining commitments and their outcomes.  The Swiss NGO 
pursued several approaches in attempts to gain commitments from the opposition 
regarding ceasing civilian targeting.  One of the main approaches involved unilateral or 
informal commitments, where opposition groups agree to make some type of internal 
change related to preventing civilian targeting.  A Swiss NGO staff member described 
this approach relaying:  
In the Syrian context until now, we use these kind of commitments trying to 
approach the ANSAs to have these unilateral commitments by declaring for 
example a code of conduct for their group, by announcing humanitarian 
statements, by declaring that we declare something on a specific issue…it’s a kind 
of self-declaration. 
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The Swiss NGO trainer also provided a similar account of these unilateral commitments 
remarking: 
One of them is through encouraging the senior leadership of integrating IHL into 
the code of conduct.  We conducted several training programs for senior leaders 
on how to do this and they started taking action.  Their action being documented 
what is still call code of conduct that they have.  Well, we comment on and we try 
to correct what they have written… . 
One of the opposition authored documents provided an example of these unilateral 
commitments (Local Coordination Committees, 2012).  It consisted of FSA units and 
Local Coordination Committees making several promises including not employing arms 
against civilians regardless of civilians’ beliefs and complying with judicial proceedings 
if they broke any of the promises in the document.  Finally, several participants 
commented how the organization has identified and trained opposition members to 
become trainers for teaching opposition elements about the rules of conflict.  This 
practice of training trainers offered another way of internally promoting and instituting 
codes of conduct within opposition groups. 
The second main approach entailed a formal commitment where an ANSA makes 
a written commitment to specific behavior changes and adopts responsibility for 
implementing these changes.  One of the opposition authored conduct documents 
represented this formal, written commitment (Xelil, Naamat, & Saruxan, 2014).  The 
signatories were three Kurdish groups: (a) the People’s Protection Units (YPG), (b) the 
Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), and (c) the Democratic Self-Administration in Rojava; 
they all formally pledged to outlaw the employment, creation, procurement, storing, and 
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delivery of landmines.  They also agreed to participate in the termination of all mines, 
help individuals impacted by mines, facilitate mine education, and participate with other 
parties in examining how they are abiding by or violating their commitments.  This 
example demonstrated how the Swiss NGO empowers armed groups to become part of 
the process in implementing commitments.  However, the organization originally created 
these formal written agreements for well-organized, structured groups, which are atypical 
within the opposition.  A Swiss NGO staff member explained:  
Until now we didn’t find an appropriate candidate for signing the [the Swiss 
NGO’s formal commitment technique] until last two months because we did sign 
with the Kurds….[F]or the Kurds, it’s different because they are stable.  They are 
well organized….They have this chain of command from the first solider at the 
border until the head and the general commander of the YPG. 
  A recurring theme that the Swiss NGO addressed in discussing commitment 
techniques was that they are a long-term process involving multiple players and 
significant trust building.  A Swiss NGO staff member outlined how first the organization 
reaches out to opposition groups directly or indirectly, conducts initial messaging, and 
proceeds with some training.  He then commented: 
We move to the next step that we encourage the leaderships to have this kind of 
commitment and back also to the consequences whether its positive or negative.  
We try also to show them the consequences of such commitment and at the same 
time, of course we focus on the implementation of the commitment….[I]t’s a kind 
of developing process. 
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The same staff member also highlighted the importance of working with others in the 
implementation phase remarking: 
It’s not only about engaging the ANSAs only….You work also with civil society 
organizations, the NGOs, the active groups because we consider them 
partners…in implementation, in pushing the groups to comply with their 
commitments and in monitoring also.  We inform the ANSAs….The population is 
also our partners and they’re watching you. 
A different Swiss NGO staff member also discussed this point relaying: 
We want to make sure that everybody, I mean the media, local organizations, all 
the relevant people in the country or their area know that they have 
signed…commitment so it puts a bit of pressure on them and also it helps us 
monitor the respect of this [the Swiss NGO’s formal commitment technique]… . 
U.S. NGO 
 The U.S. NGO is an international NGO that has its headquarters in the United 
States and regional offices around the world, including a presence in the Middle East.  
The organization conducts comprehensive investigations of violations of human rights, 
presents its findings, and advocates for victims.  In the Syrian conflict, the U.S. NGO has 
directly reached out to the opposition about its civilian targeting and engaged other 
parties, such as the UN, Gulf states, and the wider international community, about ways 
to encourage the opposition to cease civilian targeting.  One of the organization’s Middle 
East experts has carried out primary research in Syria and neighboring countries on the 
opposition’s practice of civilian targeting and created and delivered messages in attempts 
to persuade the opposition to cease this behavior.  The results drew from this staff 
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member’s input and an analysis of organizational full reports, press releases, and letters 
to relevant parties as well as opposition authored letters.   
RQ1: How Are NGOs Disseminating Messages to the Syrian Opposition and 
International Actors Regarding the Need for the Opposition to Cease Killing and 
Harming Civilians? 
Written communiqués.  The primary channel that the U.S. NGO utilized to 
disseminate messages to the opposition and international actors about the opposition’s 
practice of civilian targeting was written documents.  These documents consisted of 
detailed full reports as well as shorter presentations, such as press releases, op-eds, and 
letters.  Although these channels disseminated messages regarding accountability for all 
levels of the opposition, the messages mainly targeted the opposition’s leadership.  The 
U.S. NGO staff member remarked, “Our sort of principal way of communicating is with 
our writing with extensive reports, with press releases….We do write op-eds as well… .”  
An example of a shorter written communication was a letter the U.S. NGO sent in March 
2012 to the leader of the FSA and President of the Syrian National Council regarding 
opposition abuses including abductions, torture, and killings (U.S. NGO regional leader, 
2012). 
 Media and technological tools.  The U.S. NGO also employed traditional media, 
such as television and radio, and social media technologies, such as Facebook, Twitter, 
and YouTube.  The U.S. NGO staff member commented on the array of tools used to 
document abuses and reach the opposition stating:  
We use a range of social media tools, we use obviously Facebook and Twitter…to 
talk about our reporting and also talk about related…human rights issues.  We 
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have a YouTube page where we post videos that we produced…that would allow 
the viewers [to] hear directly from a witness or a victim or a government 
official….  
She later expanded the importance of the media as a channel remarking:  
 
Our presence in the media on TV and the radio is very important to reaching 
people inside Syria….If you are on Arabiya or Al Jazeera then you exist….[W]e 
are able to get on Arabiya or Al Jazeera…because of all of the other things that 
we’ve produced… . 
Varying message complexity.   While the U.S. NGO presented simple messages 
within in its written communiqués to the opposition about ceasing civilian targeting, the 
format of some channels increased message complexity.  The amount of detail the U.S. 
NGO presented in certain channels regarding specific opposition abuses and related legal 
codes heightened the complexity of the overall message presentation.  Full reports 
provided very detailed accounts of the opposition’s violations.  For example, a full report 
presented succinct, direct messages to the opposition about ceasing civilian targeting and 
messages to the Syrian Opposition Coalition, UN Security Council, Turkey, Gulf States, 
and all other states about taking specific actions against opposition elements involved in 
the abuses in Latakia, Syria (U.S. NGO staff member, 2013).  However, these concise 
messages were one section of a dense report, which also provided evidence of abuses 
drawn from witness statements, photos, videos, onsite investigations, and other open 
source material.   
Alternatively, press releases and letters offered a shorter format and an overall 
more simplistic message presentation than extensive reports.  One press release described 
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opposition abuses against pro-regime civilians and briefly outlined explanations of 
various legal codes, such as IHL, international human rights law, and the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions Common Article 3 (“Syria: End Opposition,” 2012).  Additionally, a letter 
from the U.S. NGO to opposition leadership presented a few examples of opposition 
violations, including abductions, torture, and killings and messages that the opposition 
should criticize and prevent these illegal behaviors (U.S. NGO regional leader, 2012).  
While the press release and the letter offered some evidence to support the messaging, the 
format was much more succinct than the full report.   
RQ2:  What Types of Attitudes Are NGOs Trying to Change within the Syrian 
Opposition Related to Ceasing the Killing and Harming Civilians? 
Negative attitudes towards civilians.  The U.S. NGO did not specifically 
address what drives the opposition’s negative attitudes towards civilians that leads to 
civilian targeting; however, the U.S. NGO frequently referenced evidence of the 
opposition’s statements and behaviors that reflected that some opposition groups hold 
negative, notably harmful, views towards civilians.  A full report on opposition abuses in 
Latakia, Syria cited one opposition member stating, “The villages fell so easily that the 
men were free to roam around and slaughter at their leisure…the Libyans [Jaish al 
Muhajireen wal Ansar] did not kill they slaughtered even women and elderly” (U.S. 
NGO staff member, 2013).  Separately, a press release described how the opposition has 
detained or kidnapped activists, relief workers, and media personnel, elaborating that 
some civilians suffered imprisonment, torture, and even death for stating their beliefs or 
helping people in need of medical or other basic services (“Syria: Website to,” 2014).  A 
letter from the U.S. NGO to the Egyptian Foreign Minister noted the IHL and human 
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rights abuses occurring in Syria (U.S. NGO issue leader and U.S. NGO regional leader, 
2013). It highlighted that the opposition has committed killings, abductions, and torture.   
Negative attitudes towards religious minorities.  In addition to the opposition’s 
harmful views towards civilians in general, the U.S. NGO identified that the opposition 
frequently exhibits these attitudes towards certain sub-groups of the civilian population.  
A recurring theme in the data was the targeting of certain religious sects, especially 
Alawites.  A staff member from the U.S. NGO commented:  
In Latakia countryside in August 2013, these series of groups…began executing 
or otherwise unlawfully killing civilians there; the fact that their being Alawite 
definitely contributed to the extent of the abuses that took place….There were 
reports indicating that over 200 individuals, mostly women and children, had been 
taken hostage… . 
Another example of harmful attitudes towards Alawites appeared in a press release where 
an opposition fighter in a video stated, “Oh my heroes of Baba Amr you slaughter the 
Alawites and take their hearts out to eat them” (“Syria: Brigade fighting,” 2013).  The 
article further described how the opposition fighter was in other videos conducting 
indiscriminate attacks on Lebanese Shia towns.  A full report also described opposition 
attacks on Syrian Alawite communities in al Nassra, Kindisiya, Zraro, Beyt Sweiha, Jurat 
al Mai, Ayn Aghazal, and Mazraa and how one opposition group graffitied a civilian’s 
house with the phrase, “The heroes of Khirbet al Jawz to the genocide of the Alawites” 
(U.S. NGO staff member, 2013).  The words “slaughter” and “genocide” illustrated that 
some opposition elements hold strong, hostile views towards this sectarian group. 
                        
 
 59 
 The U.S. NGO also presented evidence that some opposition groups have hostile 
attitudes towards Christians.  A press release described how opposition elements used a 
man as a human shield telling him, “We kill Nasara (Christians)” (“Syria: Opposition 
abuses,” 2013).  It also outlined how Jabhat al Nusra, Liwa al Huq, and Liwa al Tawhid 
destroyed Church property.  Separately, a full report referenced how Christian civilians 
from Ghasaniyeh, Syria and Jdeideh, Syria and Shia civilians from Zarzour, Syria ran 
away in December 2012 when the opposition approached (U.S. NGO staff member, 
2013).  The opposition then destroyed property from Christian and Shia sites.  These 
examples of the opposition using a Christian as a human shield and destroying Christian 
property revealed that some groups hold harmful views towards the Christian community. 
 Negative attitudes towards regime supporters.  Another civilian sub-group the 
U.S. NGO identified that the opposition views negatively are individuals who support or 
are perceived to support the regime.  In some cases, the U.S. NGO presented evidence 
where the opposition did not seem to distinguish between this civilian sub-group and 
Alawites.  Yet, other evidence portrayed opposition elements holding hostile views of 
real or perceived regime supporters regardless of their sectarian identity.  A press release 
discussed how opposition groups threatened attacks in regime-supportive neighborhoods 
or Alawite neighborhoods in Homs, Syria until the regime enabled the transportation of 
aid to areas it had under siege (“Syria: Car bombs,” 2014).  In a full report, the U.S. NGO 
explained that Jabhat al Nusra killed Sheikh Bader Ghazzal, who was an Alawite, 
because he backed the regime and noted that the opposition group disseminated a video 
of the sheikh’s body, which had numerous stab wounds (U.S. NGO staff member, 2013).  
The full report also noted that the sheikh’s family member Fadl Ghazzal had served 
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Syrian President Assad’s father, former Syrian President Hafez al Assad.  Separately, a 
letter from the U.S. NGO to opposition leadership referenced evidence of how the Abu 
Issa group abducted and killed people associated with the government (U.S. NGO 
regional leader, 2012).  The press release did not identify these people as combatants, so 
it seemed likely that they were civilians.   
RQ3: What Kinds of Persuasive Techniques Are NGOs Using and Suggesting that 
International Actors Employ in Encouraging the Syrian Opposition to Cease Killing 
and Harming Civilians? 
Relevancy of direct messaging to the opposition.  The U.S. NGO reported that 
it tailors its messaging strategy to opposition groups based on the level of importance 
each group places on international, namely western, legitimacy and support.  The 
organization relayed that it primarily utilizes direct messaging to engage opposition 
groups that care about international legitimacy and support.  The U.S. NGO staff member 
described this approach: 
For actors on the ground that do care…because they’re receiving support from 
Western states who will stop giving them that assistance…or groups that are 
trying to gain international legitimacy, like for example the Kurdish Party…the 
PYD and its militant arm….With those actors, we can actually directly engage 
with them…encourage them to make changes…we have gotten some positive 
responses in terms of commitments…to end abuse and to investigate allegations 
of abuse.  
Direct messaging about compliance and costs of noncompliance.  In 
presenting direct messages to the opposition, the U.S. NGO mainly emphasized the 
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illegal nature of civilian targeting and the opposition’s responsibility to comply with IHL.  
In a press release, the U.S. NGO outlined how the opposition carried out civilian 
executions, used a human shield, and targeted churches (“Syria: Opposition abuses,” 
2013).  The NGO further conveyed that these behaviors are war crimes with one message 
stating, “The use of human shields…is prohibited under international humanitarian law.  
Combatants who deliberately use civilians as human shields to deter attacks on their 
forces are responsible for war crimes.”  A full report on Kurdish abuses contained a legal 
section that outlined that as the acting governing structure in Afrin, Ain al Arab, and 
Jazira, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) must abide by IHL and international 
human rights law, which forbids physical and mental abuse, arrests for no legal reason, 
and the need for impartial trials (U.S. NGO staff member, 2013).  Additionally, it relayed 
the PYD’s armed faction, the People’s Protection Forces (YPG), is required to facilitate 
just judicial proceedings and violations of this privilege are war crimes.  The U.S. NGO 
staff member confirmed that the messaging revolves around the need to comply with 
international laws noting, “The bottom line is always the same….[I]t’s always that there 
is one standard and all parties are upheld to the same standard and we’re pretty 
unwavering on that….[I]t is pretty straightforward….[I]ndiscriminate attacks are 
prohibited, period.” 
 In directly messaging the opposition that it needs to comply with international 
laws regarding civilian targeting, the U.S. NGO presented costs that the opposition can 
endure for non-compliance.  The main cost the organization promoted was the legal 
consequences including international criminal prosecution.  A press release discussing 
the opposition’s violations, including Jabhat al Nusra’s car bombings in civilian areas, 
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noted that civilian targeting is a war crime and perpetrators can be charged anywhere 
(“Syria: Car bombs,” 2014).  It further highlighted that leaders are legally responsible if 
they do not stop subordinates’ behavior or turn them in for legal prosecution.  A full 
report presented a similar finding stating that opposition combatants from Ahrar al Sham, 
Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, Jabhat al Nusra, Jaish al Muhjireen wal Ansar, and 
Suquor al Izz who participated in or directed the civilian targeting in Latakia should be 
held criminally responsible (U.S. NGO staff member, 2013).  These first two examples 
demonstrated the U.S. NGO directly messaging opposition factions about criminal costs; 
however, groups, such as Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, do not 
represent opposition factions that care about international legitimacy.  Separately, a 
different full report discussed how the opposition cannot position fighters and 
infrastructure close to civilian areas (U.S. NGO regional leader, 2012).  It further outlined 
that opposition members who were in or near Dar al Shifa hospital in Allepo, Syria 
placed civilians in harms way, which is “a violation of the laws of war.”  It noted that 
disregarding IHL can lead to criminal charges.  
 The U.S. NGO also called for opposition elements to criticize other opposition 
factions engaged in civilian targeting.  By calling for opposition groups to denounce other 
groups’ practice of civilian targeting, the U.S. NGO attempted to impose internal costs 
where implicated groups would lose legitimacy and support within the opposition.  A 
press release stated, “Military and civilian Syrian opposition leaders should immediately 
take all possible measures to end the use of torture and executions by opposition groups, 
including condemning and prohibiting such practices… .” (“Syria: A priority,” 2012).  A 
full report recommended that opposition groups stop collaborating with factions that are 
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committing human rights violations against civilians and openly criticize civilian 
targeting and undiscerning strikes by opposition elements (U.S. NGO staff member, 
2013).  Separately, in a letter from the U.S. NGO to the opposition, the NGO appealed to 
the Syrian National Coalition Military Bureau, as part of its mission to oversee and guide 
the opposition, to enforce IHL and human rights and to denounce violations (U.S. NGO 
regional leader, 2012).  It also called for the opposition to denounce and prevent 
abductions, torture, and killings by opposition groups. 
Relevancy of indirect messaging to third parties.    The U.S. NGO presented 
that it primarily takes an indirect messaging approach for opposition factions that do not 
care about international, mainly western, legitimacy and support.  The organization 
expressed that it engages other actors, who are perceived to carry influence with these 
opposition groups, on ways to decrease support to these groups due to their practice of 
civilian targeting.  The U.S. NGO staff member explained:  
When it comes to trying to limit the ability of these groups to conduct obvious 
abuses, what we do here is try to encourage other actors, maybe actors that are 
more rights protective or care more about their reputation, to not coordinate or 
cooperate with these groups.  We also try to put more pressure on neighboring 
states and other states in the region particularly from the Gulf to not allow 
support, fighters, other assistance to come…to these groups. 
This strategy also included encouraging other actors to pursue steps that may dissuade 
opposition elements from committing civilian targeting.  The U.S. NGO staff member 
revealed: 
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When it comes to the deterrence, one of the main things we have been advocating 
for is credible accountability processes so that there is a credible threat that 
individuals may be held accountable for abuses….[W]e’re really pushing for the 
UN Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal 
Court… . 
Indirect messaging about pressuring the opposition.  Similar to its direct 
messaging to the opposition, the U.S. NGO messaged other actors about ways to impose 
costs on the opposition for its practice of civilian targeting.  As outlined above, a primary 
theme was the U.S. NGO calling for the UN Security Council to involve the International 
Criminal Court, so that criminal charges could be brought against opposition members 
engaged in civilian targeting.  The messaging also called for other actors, including 
states, organizations, and businesses, to support this course of action.  The previously 
noted statement from the U.S. NGO staff member, “We’re really pushing for the UN 
Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to International Criminal Court which 
would then have jurisdiction to investigate crimes perpetrated by all parties in the 
conflict” highlighted this approach.  Additionally, a letter from the U.S. NGO to 
Kuwait’s government called for Kuwait to back a Swiss proposal advocating for the UN 
Security Council to recommend that the International Criminal Court take action in Syria 
(U.S. NGO issue leader & U.S. NGO regional leader, 2013).  A full report also included 
recommendations that states advocate that the UN Security Council recommend the 
International Criminal Court take action in Syria, because it is the body best positioned to 
examine and prosecute individuals responsible for the atrocities during the war (U.S. 
NGO staff member, 2013).   
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The U.S. NGO also called for other actors to publicly criticize the opposition’s 
practice of civilian targeting.  Public condemnations offered a mechanism for levying 
costs because they can decrease opposition groups’ legitimacy and potential external 
support.  A press release indirectly recommended that France, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States openly criticize the opposition for 
IHL and human rights violations (“Syria: End opposition,” 2012).  Separately, in a full 
report, the U.S. NGO called for the League of Arab States; the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation; and India, Brazil, and South Africa, who had seats on the Security Council 
at the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, to criticize the opposition and regime for IHL 
breaches (U.S. NGO staff member & U.S. NGO issue leader, 2013).  A different full 
report promoted a similar message calling on Gulf States to openly criticize violations by 
the opposition and restrict support to Ahrar al Sham, Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, 
Jabhat al Nusra, Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar, and Suquor al Izz (U.S. NGO staff 
member, 2013). 
Finally, the U.S. NGO encouraged other actors to cut material and non-material 
support as a means for imposing costs on the opposition.  Material and non-material 
support included arms, training, funding, and the ability for opposition members and their 
supplies to transit countries.  The U.S. NGO staff member noted: 
We also try to put more pressure on neighboring states and other states in the 
region particularly from the Gulf to not allow support, fighters, other assistance to 
come into the country and to these groups.  So really restricting the flows of the 
money and fighters to these groups. 
                        
 
 66 
A press release demonstrated this approach in that it called on the UN Security Council to 
implement an arms embargo, including banning weapons, training, and other support, to 
the regime and opposition elements who have participated in extensive human rights 
violations (“UN Security Council,” 2013).  Separately, a full report outlined that Turkey 
should bolster law enforcement at its border to prevent combatants and weapons reaching 
groups who are tied to human rights violations (U.S. NGO staff member, 2013).  
Source characteristics.  The U.S. NGO’s authoritative expertise was one key 
characteristic of its organization’s portrayal.  The organization’s authoritative expertise 
came across in its firm tone in the messaging, its extensive work in documenting the 
opposition’s practice of civilian targeting, and its presentation of international law 
regarding civilian targeting.  Evidence of its firm, but informed stance, appeared in a 
press release that outlined how it had previously urged the UN Security Council to press 
the International Criminal Court to pursue action against war crimes in Syria (“Syria: 
Brigade fighting,” 2013).  It also referenced studies and legal codes, notably the Rome 
Statue of the International Criminal Court that states that disrespecting a corpse is a war 
crime.  Separately, in a full report, the U.S. NGO presented in-depth examples of the 
opposition causing civilian death and harm in Latakia (U.S. NGO staff member, 2013).  It 
detailed how the NGO examined photos of victims from Barouda, Syria whose bodies 
were burned; talked with a civilian in Nbeiteh, Syria who viewed an 80 year old victim’s 
dead body; and spoke with a medical staff member from Latakia hospital who relayed 
how a young female patient recounted that she witnessed her parents and four siblings 
being killed.   The report’s messaging was stern with one message stating, “Immediately 
stop indiscriminate attacks and targeted attacks against civilians including summary and 
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extra-judicial killings.”  Another telling example of the U.S. NGO portraying its 
knowledge appeared in its letter to opposition leadership where it acknowledged the 
complexity of the battlefield, highlighting that certain opposition groups may be outside 
the control of the Syrian National Coalition and its Military Bureau (U.S. NGO regional 
leader, 2012). 
  Another key characteristic in the U.S. NGO’s organizational portrayal was its 
emphasis on neutrality.  The U.S. NGO staff member highlighted this point stating, “We 
always identify ourselves as an independent international human rights organization.”  
She later provided an example of her organization’s neutral approach explaining: 
The PYD are…not nearly as egregious as what the government has done in terms 
of scope and severity.  Regardless of that…we would condemn those violations 
just as we would condemn government violations.  We don’t use the Syrian 
government as the standard, we use human rights laws standards. 
In its full report on the PYD, the NGO further conveyed its impartiality providing 
evidence from multiple perspectives about alleged PYD abuses during protests in Amuda, 
Syria (U.S. NGO advisor & U.S. NGO staff member, 2014).  It outlined evidence from 
both the PYD and PYD opposition parties and activists.  A press release also displayed 
the U.S. NGO’s neutral approach where it called out both regime and opposition 
violations, noting that the government needs to cease using cluster munitions and barrel 
bombs and the opposition should cease employing car bombs and mortars (“Syria: Justice 
essential,” 2014).   
 The data also highlighted how the U.S. NGO sometimes collaborates with other 
partners in promoting messages.  In these instances, the organization’s portrayal was not 
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independent but united with other organizations.  Thirty seven human rights 
organizations, including the U.S. NGO, sent a letter to the Foreign Ministers of the UN 
Security Council members imploring them to call for a resolution that would order all 
sides to enable safe and unrestricted access for relief efforts in all parts of the country 
(Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture et al., 2014).   A press release exhibited 
a similar approach where the U.S. NGO partnered with 116 civil society groups to advise 
the U.N. Security Council to enable the International Criminal Court to take action in 
Syria (Action des Chretiens pour l’Abolition de la Torture et al., 2014).  The U.S. NGO 
staff member confirmed this sourcing approach and the similar messaging strategies 
employed by its partners noting: 
We do sort of partner with a number of different organizations.  We used many of 
the same strategies or sorts of messages and in fact doing so…helps us to make 
the calls more robust or give them more weight like…being in line with one 
another. 
This example further demonstrated the U.S. NGO’s approach of sometimes partnering 
with other organizations to disseminate messages, and also that the organization believed 
that unified messages or similar messages from different organizations increase 
messages’ effectiveness. 
 The last characteristic that defined the organization’s portrayal was the degree to 
which it mentioned itself.  Generally, the organization mentioned itself briefly.  The U.S. 
NGO staff member touched on this point expressing: 
We don’t really make a fuss for being [the NGO’s name] but sometimes it does 
come up and we do discuss it but it’s usually really about, we’re going into your 
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community because we’re concerned about government indiscriminate acts…and 
we’re here focusing on this issue and then proceed…on the basis of abuses that 
we’re discussing more than who we are. 
While the above example touched on a scenario involving the regime and not the 
opposition, it showed that the U.S. NGO’s focus was addressing indiscriminate attacks 
not its organization portrayal.  A press release complimented this result, showing varying 
degrees of the organization’s name in its messaging (“Syria: Brigade fighting,” 2013).  A 
senior staff member commented, “One important way to stop Syria’s daily horrors, from 
beheadings to mutilations to executions, is to strip all sides from their sense of impunity.”  
A separate part of the same press release without mentioning the organization noted, 
“The laws of war prohibit any mutilation of dead bodies.”  The full reports had a similar 
format where one report stated, “To address the shortcomings, [the NGO’s name] 
recommends the authorities take a number of steps.  These include forming an 
independent commission to review the cases of those allegedly detained on political 
grounds… .” (U.S. NGO advisor & U.S. NGO staff member, 2014).  A separate section 
outlined recommendations without mentioning the NGO’s name or any other 
organizational information.   
Strategies for gaining commitments and their outcomes.  The U.S. NGO’s 
primary mechanism for attempting to gain commitments from the opposition that it will 
cease civilian targeting entailed publishing opposition abuses and providing the 
opposition the opportunity to make a public commitment to correct the behavior.  The 
publications typically involved written reports or letters regarding evidence of opposition 
groups killing or harming civilians.  The U.S. NGO staff member explained: 
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We basically say that we documented these abuses, ask them to comment…let 
them know that if they make a commitment to investigate or if they make a 
commitment to end such attacks that we would publish that along with the report 
and suggest an indication that these abuses had occurred in the past but they made 
a commitment to stop them from happening in the future.   
A full report provided another example detailing how the U.S. NGO had sent Asayish, 
the PYD’s police force, a letter about alleged Asayish abuses (U.S. NGO advisor & U.S. 
NGO staff member, 2014).  The letter asked about corrective actions, such as if members 
had been punished or charged for cases of torture and mistreatment of prisoners; if the 
organization was examining the events in Amuda where protestors were killed and, if so, 
where the process was and who was leading it; and if detainees had had legal trials.  The 
letter promised to include Asayish’s response in its impending report on the issue.  In 
response, an Asayish commander addressed some of the issues, claiming that five 
members of the organization were punished for torturing prisoners and three for abuses 
against citizens, investigations were carried out, and that trials occurred for detainees.  
Separately, a press release described face-to-face discussions and a letter in which the 
U.S. NGO relayed to the opposition results and suggestions from its study about 
opposition violations and the opposition’s subsequent response (“Syria: End opposition,” 
2012).  The opposition’s Military Council for the Aleppo Governorate replied in writing 
that based on the NGO’s report it conveyed to FSA units that it is dedicated to 
humanitarian law and human rights, creating boards to examine prisons and detainee 
treatment, and enforcing accountability.  Also, in discussions, local opposition leaders 
recognized evidence of prisoner abuse and claimed new facilities were being created to 
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address the problems.  Yet, the press release noted that, despite these commitments, 
















































Comparison with Previous Research and Between the Swiss and U.S. NGOs 
The literature presented numerous findings related to understanding and 
influencing ANSAs and Arab audiences’ attitudes and behaviors but drew mostly from 
quantitative studies.  The current study’s qualitative approach expanded upon this earlier 
research and delved deeper into exploring how two NGOs utilized persuasive techniques 
in encouraging the Syrian opposition to cease civilian targeting.  This section highlights 
similarities and differences between the literature and the current study as well as 
similarities and differences between the Swiss and U.S. NGOs’ approaches. 
 Syrian information sources.  Earlier research provided evidence that Syrian 
audiences with anti-regime views and refugee populations rely on informal networks, Al 
Arabiya, Al Jazeera, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube for information (Charney & Quirk, 
2014; Giovanni, 2013).  The current study’s results revealed that the Swiss and U.S. 
NGOs utilized some of these same channels in disseminating messages to the opposition. 
The U.S. NGO released messages via Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, and Twitter, and both the 
Swiss and U.S. NGOs leveraged Facebook and YouTube.  The Swiss NGO’s results also 
showed that the opposition further disseminated the NGO’s campaign videos through 
Facebook, Twitter, and Al Arabiya, confirming that these are information sources for the 
opposition.  Additionally, given the similarity between the earlier studies’ Syrian 
audiences and the opposition, it is plausible that the opposition also follows Al Jazeera, 
supporting the U.S. NGO’s utilization of this channel to disseminate messages.   
 The current study’s findings also revealed the importance that the Swiss NGO 
placed on meetings and trainings in reaching the opposition.  These types of face-to-face 
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interactions were a key aspect of the Swiss NGO’s messaging and offered a way to 
convey messages through the opposition’s interpersonal networks.  
 Opposition’s negative attitudes towards civilian sub-groups.  Several previous 
studies addressed how in-groups’ negative perceptions of out-groups can lead to inter-
group hostility.  Findings revealed how some opposition members viewed all Alawites, 
including civilians, as the enemy; other results highlighted how during the Rwandan 
conflict, in-group members were likely to see all out-group members as the same, 
specifically many Rwandan Hutus viewed all Rwandan Tutsi as the same and aligned 
with the Tutsi rebels (Civilians in Conflict, 2012; McDoom, 2012).  The Swiss and U.S. 
NGO’s findings on the opposition’s negative attitudes towards civilian out-groups 
confirmed this earlier research.  The Swiss NGO revealed how some opposition elements 
do not distinguish between the regime and certain civilian sub-groups, specifically 
Alawites and regime supporters, making these sub-groups aligned with the enemy (the 
regime) and leading to their targeting.  The U.S. NGO also noted the opposition’s hostile 
attitudes towards Alawites and regime supporters and highlighted harmful views towards 
Christian civilians.  These findings revealed that the opposition’s hostile attitudes towards 
out-groups, mainly civilian Alawites and regime supporters, contributed to inter-group 
hostility, specifically targeting of these civilians. 
 Audience segmentation.  The literature review did not specifically address 
audience segmentation, but the current research did.  The U.S. NGO reported that it 
directly engaged opposition groups that care about international legitimacy and law but 
reached out to third parties about ways to apply pressure to opposition groups that do not 
care about international legitimacy and law.  In support of the latter approach, the 
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shaming literature highlighted how third party shaming had some success in decreasing 
political violence, including how human rights shaming coupled with third party shaming 
improved states’ human rights behaviors (Krain, 2012; Murdie & Davis, 2012; Ruggeri & 
Burgoon, 2012).  Compared to the U.S. NGO, the Swiss NGO primarily directly engaged 
opposition groups but tailored messaging depending on a group’s views towards 
international and Islamic law.  These different audience segmentation approaches were 
one of the main differences between the NGOs’ persuasive messaging.   
Persuasive messaging with costs highlighted through shaming.  As noted 
above, earlier quantitative studies offered some evidence that shaming by external 
parties, such as UNHCR, human rights organizations, and the media can decrease 
political violence (Krain, 2012; Murdie & Davis, 2012; Ruggeri & Burgoon, 2012).  The 
Swiss and U.S. NGOs also utilized shaming efforts in attempts to highlight the costs of 
civilian targeting and thus decrease this behavior within the opposition.  The U.S. NGO 
directly messaged the opposition on the illegal nature of civilian targeting, specifically 
that it is a war crime and will result in criminal prosecution, and advocated for opposition 
groups to internally criticize factions engaging in civilian targeting.  Furthermore, it 
called for states and organizations to support involving the International Criminal Court 
so it could levy criminal charges on opposition groups perpetrating abuses, publicly 
criticize the opposition’s practice of civilian targeting, and decrease material and non-
material support to implicated groups.   Internal and external criticisms and decreased 
support reflected earlier traditional shaming approaches.  Alternatively, the Swiss NGO’s 
shaming techniques directed at the opposition also involved conveying the legal 
consequences of civilian targeting, such as criminal charges, and the loss of domestic 
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legitimacy; yet, it also employed a non-traditional shaming technique by advocating 
moral costs.   Thus, while both organizations framed shaming messages around 
punishments and criticisms the opposition will endure for committing civilian targeting, 
their shaming approaches differed.  The U.S. NGO’s approach mainly aligned with 
earlier shaming techniques, while the Swiss NGO utilized more Syrian based shaming 
and incorporated moral costs.  
 Persuasive messaging promoting benefits.  The previous section highlighted 
how the NGOs presented costs for civilian targeting and how they could be considered 
forms of shaming.  The current study, specifically the Swiss NGO’s messaging, also 
illuminated how to promote the benefits of ceasing civilian targeting.  The Swiss NGO’s 
messaging conveyed how the opposition could gain domestic and international legitimacy 
and military gains.  The Swiss NGO’s approach of presenting benefits and costs related 
to civilian targeting represented a key difference between its and the U.S. NGO’s 
messaging, which solely stressed the costs.  Furthermore, the literature review did not 
identify research on communicating the benefits of a behavior change to ANSAs.  The 
Swiss NGO’s findings offered new evidence based research for the literature on framing 
persuasive messages to ANSAs around the benefits of civilian protection.    
 Source effects.  An earlier study addressing commitment techniques produced a 
finding on how non-biased mediators positively contributed to ANSAs’ peace 
commitments (Svensson, 2007).  Both NGOs underscored the importance of stressing 
their neutrality, which would align with the earlier study’s approach of the benefits of 
using non-biased mediators.  The U.S. NGO emphasized its neutrality by highlighting its 
independence, seeking out alternative explanations of potential opposition abuses, and 
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messaging all parties about ceasing civilian targeting.  The Swiss NGO depicted its 
neutrality by disseminating campaign videos to all sides and noted how neutrality is key 
to gaining trust and influence with the opposition.  These similar approaches supported 
the idea of how non-biased sources can potentially positively influence an ANSA’s 
behaviors.    
In contrast, the organizations differed in how they leveraged partnerships.  The 
Swiss NGO to some degree attempted to get the opposition to view it positively.  The 
Swiss NGO’s engagement approach entailed partnering with local Syrian organizations 
that opposition groups trust.  This approach enabled the Swiss NGO to gain access and 
eventually build trust with opposition groups, which typically distrust western 
organizations.  Thus, the Swiss NGO’s partnerships with trusted, local organizations led 
opposition groups to view the Swiss NGO more positively.  Also, the Swiss NGO took a 
long-term approach at building trust with opposition groups, which may have further 
positively impacted its source credibility and made groups receptive to messages about 
civilian targeting.  This finding somewhat confirmed an earlier study’s finding that 
revealed how positive attitudes towards international sources contributed to adopting the 
source’s domestic policy position (Dragojlovic, 2013).  Alternatively, the U.S. NGO also 
partnered with other organizations to disseminate messages, but the intent differed.  The 
partnerships served to amplify messaging and present a united front on communicating 
the costs of civilian targeting, such as urging the UN Security Council to enable the 
International Criminal Court to take action.   
 Commitment techniques.  Earlier studies addressed how external and internal 
commitments positively contributed to influencing ANSAs and states’ behaviors 
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(Manekin, 2013; Nilsson, 2008).  External commitments were formal pledges ANSAs 
made to other parties, and the Swiss and U.S. NGOs employed commitment strategies 
similar to these techniques.   These strategies included: (a) the Swiss NGO’s formal 
commitment technique where an opposition group makes a written commitment to a 
specific behavior change and adopts responsibility for implementing the change and (b) 
the U.S. NGO’s approach of presenting the opposition with evidence of its civilian 
targeting and then enabling opposition groups to make public commitments to rectify the 
behavior.  Both organizations applied this approach with Kurdish armed factions, 
specifically the YPG and the Asayish.    
 Internal commitments involved members of ANSAs or armed state units pledging 
to follow internal codes and the enforcement of these behaviors.  The Swiss NGO’s 
unilateral commitments represented forms of earlier internal commitments and comprised 
codes of conduct, such as the FSA and Local Coordination Committees’ document, 
opposition groups making public statements, and opposition groups conducting internal 
training on preventing civilian targeting.   Additionally, the Swiss NGO took a long-term 
approach to securing different commitments from opposition groups and working with 
them to implement and monitor behavior changes. 
Recommendations for Practitioners 
 The recommendations below offer ways communication practitioners can apply 
the study’s findings to decrease the opposition’s practice of civilian targeting.  The 
suggestions have no hierarchy and their application may depend on an organization’s 
goals, objectives, and resources.  Additionally, while the recommendations are tailored to 
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the opposition, they may also help inform communication and program efforts aimed at 
influencing similar ANSAs, especially in the Middle East context. 
Leverage primary channels the opposition follows.   Messages intended for the 
opposition about ceasing civilian targeting should be disseminated through their primary 
media and social media channels, notably Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube, and through interpersonal networks.  The U.S. NGO discussed how it utilized 
Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera, and the influence these channels have in reaching Arab 
audiences.  Also, the Swiss NGO noted how the opposition disseminated the NGO’s 
campaign videos on Al Arabiya, and the literature review offered evidence of similar 
Syrian audiences following Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera (Giovanni, 2013).  Both NGOs 
leveraged Facebook and YouTube, and the U.S. NGO also highlighted its use of Twitter.  
Lastly, the literature review provided support for similar Syrian audiences relying on 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube for information.    
Additionally, the importance of interpersonal channels as a means for reaching the 
opposition cannot be overstated.   Messages can be disseminated directly to opposition 
groups via interpersonal channels or indirectly through individuals who have contact with 
opposition groups.  The Swiss NGO recounted how it primarily employed meetings and 
trainings in engaging the opposition about ceasing civilian targeting and how it leveraged 
local partners who opposition groups trust in initially reaching out to some groups.   
Simple but captivating message designs for wider opposition audiences.  To 
reach across opposition groups and wider Syrian audiences, message designs should be 
simple but appealing.  The Swiss NGO relayed how the simple, short but attractive 
design of the video campaign appealed to many audiences.  It also highlighted how future 
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channels, notably mobile apps, will allow opposition members to have an interactive, 
appealing experience in receiving messages about preventing civilian targeting.  
Tailor channels to tiers within the opposition.  Channels with simple message 
presentations, such as booklets and videos, offer ways to reach opposition fighters on the 
ground; means that allow for more complex formats, such as extensive reports and letters, 
can be effective for engaging opposition leaders.  The Swiss NGO reported how booklets 
were simple ways for disseminating messages to opposition members in the field and that 
videos offered a way for reaching across opposition groups and to wider Syrian 
audiences.  Alternatively, the U.S. NGO noted how written communiqués, such as full 
reports and letters, were their main mode for engaging the opposition, and their primary 
target audience was the leadership.  Evidence showed different opposition leaders 
responding to the U.S. NGO’s full reports and letters.  Thus, channels that present 
concise, visually appealing messages may be effective for reaching fighters in the field, 
while channels that offer detailed, evidence-based messages may be effective for 
engaging the leadership. 
Change attitudes by highlighting similarities.  In efforts to positively change 
attitudes towards civilians, messages to the opposition could highlight that some 
opposition members and all Syrian civilians share similarities, such as a common national 
identity.  Both NGOs addressed how opposition groups targeted two civilian sub-groups, 
Alawites and perceived or real regime supporters.  The Swiss NGO described how the 
opposition perceives these civilian sub-groups as an extension of the regime.  The 
literature review also noted evidence of how, in conflict settings, in-groups did not make 
distinctions between civilian out-groups and armed out-groups, making these civilian out-
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groups a threat aligned with the enemy (Civilians in Conflict, 2012; McDoom 2012).  
Messages could counter this perception by emphasizing links, notably national identity, 
which opposition and civilian sub-groups have in common.  In becoming more aware that 
they share the same national identity, some opposition groups may view these civilian 
sub-groups as members of their in-group (Syrians) and be less inclined to engage in 
civilian targeting. 
Segment opposition audiences.  Given the complexity of the opposition’s 
composition, opposition audiences could be segmented so that messages could be tailored 
to individual group’s knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes.  One way to segment opposition 
audiences is by the value the groups place on international or Islamic laws.  The Swiss 
NGO described how it primarily framed messages around international legitimacy and 
accountability for secular or moderate Islamic groups and mainly addressed Islamic law 
when reaching out to more conservative Islamic groups.  These different messaging lines 
enabled the Swiss NGO to frame messages in ways that resonate with a group’s values.  
Additionally, Levin, Nichols, and Johnson’s theoretical research (as cited in Stiff & 
Mongeau, 2003) regarding value-relevant involvement argued that message receivers are 
likely to take an interest in messaging that is tied to their values.  They reasoned that 
messages related to a receiver’s values lead a receiver to convey or preserve his/her 
values.  Thus, the Swiss NGO’s approach of framing messages around the values of an 
opposition group, such as international accountability or Islamic law, contained support 
in the theoretical literature.   
Another way to segment opposition audiences based on knowledge and attitudes 
is to identify a group’s knowledge of laws regarding civilian targeting and its attitudes 
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towards civilians with perceived connections to the regime.  Opposition groups that lack 
knowledge of the law and/or have extremely hostile views of civilians with perceived 
connections to the regime could first be messaged with information about international 
and Islamic laws regarding civilian targeting.  Additionally, they could receive messages 
about the costs of committing civilian targeting and the benefits of preventing it.  Other 
groups who hold more favorable attitudes towards civilians with perceived connections to 
the regime could receive messages about how to change their behaviors and adopt initial 
commitments towards civilian protection.  Different groups have varying levels of 
knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors towards civilians and messages should account for 
where these groups fall along the spectrum.  The Swiss NGO incorporated this approach 
when it identified that some opposition groups were ready to make formal commitments 
to civilian protection, while others were only prepared to adopt unilateral commitments.  
The theoretical literature, specifically the Transtheoretical Model and its construct of the 
Stages of Change, proposed that behavior change occurs through a series of steps that 
does not always have a linear format (Prochaska, Redding, & Evers, 2008).  Furthermore, 
its construct of Process of Change argued that individuals employ different strategies as 
they proceed from one stage to the next, and the concept of Decisional Balance stated that 
individuals will consider the benefits and drawbacks of modifying their behavior.  
Therefore, the theoretical research offered support for segmenting opposition audiences 
based on the degree to which they understand laws regarding civilian targeting and the 
specific state of their attitudes (how negative or positive) and tailoring messages based on 
where they are in the process of changing their behavior.   
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Lastly, opposition audiences could be segmented based on their members’ 
nationalities, mainly if they are Syrian or foreigners.  Some of the conservative Islamic 
opposition groups with foreign fighters may be receptive to messages about Islamic law; 
yet, opposition groups with mostly foreign fighters, regardless of their religious values, 
may be unreceptive to messages about gaining or losing long-term legitimacy with the 
Syrian populace.  Since they are not Syrians, foreign fighters may not be concerned with 
building popular support in Syria.  Instead, messages could be tailored to the regional and 
national identities of these opposition groups.  For example, groups composed of mostly 
North Africans could receive messages on how, by engaging in civilian targeting, they 
are committing atrocities similar to the abuses of previous North African dictators, such 
as former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.   
Message the opposition about the costs of civilian targeting.  Messaging efforts 
should communicate how by committing civilian targeting opposition groups will endure 
numerous costs including legal charges, decreased legitimacy, and moral costs. The U.S. 
and Swiss NGOs addressed how they conveyed the legal repercussions, including 
criminal prosecution, and decreased legitimacy the opposition will endure for civilian 
targeting.  The Swiss NGO also highlighted the moral costs for civilian targeting.  It is 
important to note that messages regarding moral costs must originate from credible 
sources who are Muslim and have knowledge of Islamic law.  The Swiss NGO’s 
messages regarding moral costs originated from a Muslim source, who is an expert in 
Islamic law, making him a credible source for this line of messaging.  Additionally, the 
theoretical literature, notably the Health Belief Model (HBM), offered support for 
publicizing costs (Champion & Skinner, 2008).  The HBM proposed that the likelihood 
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that an individual alters his/her behavior is a cognitive process affected by several factors, 
including the perceived barriers of a behavior.  Perceived barriers were similar to costs 
where they represented the drawbacks of engaging in a specific behavior.  Although this 
theory attempted to explain and offer ways to influence health behaviors, its construct of 
how costs can influence an individual’s decision to engage in a behavior, offered further 
support for promoting messages around the costs of civilian targeting. 
Other costs that could be promoted, which were not specifically addressed by the 
NGOs, are the economic costs Syria will endure for the loss of civilian life and the 
destruction of civilian property, such as hospitals, markets, and schools.  Civilian 
targeting will only further decrease the number of Syrians with education and skills, 
which will be vital when the conflict ends and the country needs to be rebuilt.  Also, the 
ongoing destruction of civilian infrastructure will increase the amount of time and 
resources it will take to rebuild Syria and increase Syria’s dependence on foreign aid.     
Message the opposition about the benefits of ceasing civilian targeting.  In 
addition to promoting messages to the opposition about the costs for conducting civilian 
targeting, messages should also promote the benefits for not engaging in civilian 
targeting, such as obtaining legitimacy and military gains.  The findings from the Swiss 
NGO illuminated how it presented benefits for protecting civilians, such as legitimacy 
and military gains, to the opposition.  The aforementioned HBM also offered support for 
publicizing benefits (Champion & Skinner, 2008).  The HBM argued that an individual’s 
decision to adopt a behavior is also impacted by the perceived benefits of the behavior.  
This theoretical research provided additional support for advocating the benefits of not 
committing civilian targeting.  
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Another benefit related to military gains that could be promoted is that preventing 
civilian targeting could contribute to the longevity of opposition groups.  ANSAs that do 
not have defined rules and regulations, such as rules regarding civilian targeting, are 
unstructured and vulnerable.  Without such behavior codes, ANSAs like any group are 
prone to problems, such as leaders and members pursuing their own interests, disputing 
over strategy and tactics, and making inconsistent decisions.  Opposition groups that are 
more structured, including those with rules governing civilian targeting, may be less 
likely to experience internal fracturing and preserve their existence. 
Further highlight opposition groups that make commitments to civilian 
protection.  In messaging about the benefits of gaining legitimacy for not conducting 
civilian targeting, messages could showcase opposition groups that have committed to 
protecting civilians and emphasize the importance of their oaths.  These messages would 
need to be very tailored so that opposition groups received information about 
comparable, relevant groups.  For example, more conservative Islamic groups could 
receive information about commitments to civilian protection other conservative Islamic 
groups have taken.  This approach would draw on the persuasive techniques of  (a) social 
proof which argued that individuals are influenced by others’ conduct and (b) similarity 
principles which maintained that individuals are influenced by other individuals who are 
perceived as sharing similar qualities with them (Cialdini, 2009). 
Encourage other actors to promote the costs and benefits to the opposition.  
By urging other parties to disseminate messages about the costs of civilian targeting and 
the benefits of civilian protection, communication practitioners can enhance direct 
messaging to the opposition and potentially reach opposition groups that are unreceptive 
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to direct messaging.  Third party messaging should be tailored so that messages convey 
exactly how third parties can influence specific opposition groups, such as encouraging 
Gulf states and organizations to prevent funding from reaching opposition groups 
conducting civilian targeting.  The U.S. NGO described how in targeting opposition 
groups that are not concerned about international legitimacy and law, it messaged other 
actors on ways to impose costs, such as levying criminal charges, making public 
criticisms, and cutting material and non-material support to these groups.  
Synchronize messaging approaches.  Organizations seeking to cease the 
opposition’s practice of civilian targeting could collaborate to create and disseminate 
complimentary messages in efforts to further enhance messaging.  One way to implement 
this recommendation is to disseminate messages to third parties about pursuing criminal 
charges prior to or during training sessions and meetings with opposition groups that are 
addressing the consequences of violating international law.  Opposition groups would 
then see this line of messaging reinforced through multiple channels.  The Swiss and U.S. 
NGOs both offered messaging approaches that present unique strengths.  The U.S. 
NGO’s third party messaging offered a way of applying pressure indirectly, while the 
Swiss NGO’s direct messaging through meetings and trainings enabled it to build trust 
and influence with opposition groups.  Also, both NGOs highlighted their partnerships 
and the value they place on working with others.  Messaging efforts that simultaneously 
leverage different organizational approaches may offer opportunities to further influence 
the opposition’s behavior toward civilians.   
Limit the organizational footprint and stress neutrality.  Messages to the 
opposition should limit an organization’s portrayal as much as possible, and 
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organizations should stress their neutrality when presenting organizational information.  
The Swiss NGO’s explanations of how some opposition groups distrust foreigners, 
particularly western organizations, emphasized the importance of minimizing western 
ties.  Additionally, both NGOs presented themselves as neutral organizations, and the 
Swiss NGO recounted how this was key to obtaining trust with opposition groups.   
Partner with existing trusted partners.  Another avenue to bolster source 
credibility is to partner with existing trusted, local organizations.  The Swiss NGO 
recounted how when it initially engaged opposition groups it relied on partnerships with 
local organizations, which opposition groups already trust.  This approach helped the 
Swiss NGO gain access and trust with opposition groups that otherwise would have been 
skeptical and potentially unreceptive to a western organization’s messaging. 
Empower opposition groups to be participants in commitments to civilian 
protection.  Commitment techniques should provide ways for opposition groups to both 
lead and participate in implementing commitments to civilian protection, such as 
participating in evaluation assessments.  Empowering opposition groups to be active 
participants in implementing commitments can help these groups take ownership and 
sustain their commitments to protecting civilians.  The Swiss NGO relayed how they 
utilized both unilateral and more formal written commitments in attempts to gain 
commitments from the opposition.  These approaches included ways in which opposition 
groups would implement commitments.  These techniques were adaptive and represented 
long-term approaches to instituting changes within opposition groups.   
 
 




 The current study had several limitations, especially regarding its sample due to 
language capabilities.  While the case study offered an in-depth examination of how the 
Swiss and U.S. NGOs carried out persuasive messaging with the opposition, it was 
unfeasible to examine the U.S. NGO’s Facebook and Twitter messaging, which were in 
Arabic.  These results would have provided further insight on the U.S. NGO’s persuasive 
messaging and the opportunity to compare this messaging with their traditional written 
communiqués.  Also, it would have provided the chance to examine direct social media 
messaging to certain opposition leaders.  Another limitation related to language 
capabilities was that the Swiss NGO’s training modules and booklets were the English 
language versions.  The Swiss NGO staff relayed that the materials were very similar to 
the Arabic versions presented to the opposition, but they did not offer an exact reflection 
of what the opposition received.   
 Other limitations related to the study’s sample were its small size.  The in-depth 
interviews included one interview with the U.S. NGO and three total interviews with the 
Swiss NGO and a training partner.  While all of the participants’ input was extremely 
valuable, the sample size was small for research purposes.  Two other limitations related 
to the scope of the sample.  First, there were potential opportunities to interview political 
opposition members and Syrian organizational partners.  However, due to HIRB 
constraints, this opportunity could not be pursued.  These results would have provided a 
Syrian perspective on the Swiss NGO’s persuasive efforts, which would have been very 
valuable.   Second, the U.S. NGO’s messages to third parties utilized persuasive tactics in 
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attempts to influence these actors to take action.  Given the study’s scope, it was not 
possible to examine those persuasive efforts.   
 Lastly, the study utilized triangulation to address validity, however it did not 
account for personal biases in the data collection and analysis.  The study’s qualitative 
approach made the results subjective and additional measures, such as a daily journal that 
recorded how my opinions may have impacted the research and coding, could have 
helped strengthen the study’s validity.   
Future Research  
 The current study offered value in understanding how two NGOs are conducting 
persuasive messaging with the opposition that can inform ongoing and future 
communication efforts with the opposition and similar ANSAs.  Future research could 
expand upon these findings and address some of the shortcomings of the study to further 
shape future messaging to the opposition and similar ANSAs. 
 Study on social media messaging.  A qualitative content analysis could examine 
the U.S. NGO and other similar NGOs’ Facebook, Twitter, and other social media 
messages to the opposition about ceasing civilian targeting.  Furthermore, the study could 
examine the corresponding posts from the opposition.   The findings would provide 
insight on how NGOs are framing social media messages to the opposition, the types of 
messages that may contribute to responses from the opposition, the opposition groups and 
members that are utilizing social media, and how these opposition factions are framing 
responses to the NGOs’ messages.  The findings revealing who within the opposition is 
utilizing these channels could inform audience segmentation for future social media 
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campaigns, so that messages are tailored to specific opposition groups and individuals.  
Moreover, the findings on message content could help shape the design of the messages.  
 Study on third party messaging.  A qualitative content analysis could explore 
the U.S. NGO’s messaging to third parties regarding the need to stop the opposition’s 
practice of civilian targeting.  As outlined above, the findings would reveal what 
persuasive techniques the U.S. NGO employs in attempts to influence these actors’ 
behaviors that in-turn are meant to encourage the opposition to cease civilian targeting.  
The results would also offer takeaways on similarities and differences in the strategies the 
U.S. NGO employs depending on the type of third party.  Communication practitioners 
could apply these lessons learned to future messaging efforts to third parties regarding the 
need to cease the opposition and similar ANSAs’ behavior of civilian targeting.   
Study on the opposition’s responses to commitment techniques.  A case study 
could examine how the opposition has responded to the Swiss and U.S. NGOs’ 
commitment strategies.  The study could produce an in-depth examination of internal and 
external documents regarding messages that the opposition has crafted and disseminated 
in response to formal and unilateral commitments to cease civilian targeting.  It could 
also involve in-depth interviews with opposition leaders and members as well as with 
organizations working with opposition groups in implementing these commitments.  One 
aspect that could be explored is how opposition groups’ attitudes and behaviors reflect 
support for or violate these commitments.  While these qualitative findings could not 
provide a measurement of the effectiveness of the commitment techniques, they could 
lend insight on how attitudes and behaviors towards civilian targeting may be shifting 
due in part to these commitment efforts.  The results could be applied to inform other 
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commitment strategies that seek to positively influence the opposition and similar 
ANSAs’ behaviors.   
 Study on the opposition’s views of messages and channels.  Surveys and focus 
groups could investigate how opposition members view NGOs’ messages and channels 
about civilian targeting.  The surveys could be administered following training sessions, 
while focus groups could be conducted with previous training participants. One specific 
aspect that could be explored in the focus groups is how opposition members view 
sources within messages and what would make sources appear more trustworthy.  
Surveys could also address which factors are likely to increase and decrease opposition 
members’ trust in a message source and which channels (videos, booklets, PowerPoint 
sessions, studies, etc.) appear to contain credible information.  The findings could inform 
future source and channel selection for messaging efforts targeting the opposition and 
similar ANSAs.    
 Study on changing attitudes.  A long-term longitudinal study could utilize 
surveys and in-depth interviews to explore how opposition groups’ attitudes towards 
civilians may change over time.  Prior to training sessions, surveys could be administered 
to opposition members to determine how much they like or dislike civilians who have 
different sectarian, ethnic, political, and national identities and how likely they would be 
to target these civilian sub-groups.  In-depth interviews could build off these questions, 
asking opposition members why they like or dislike civilian sub-groups and why they 
may be targeted.  Following training sessions, the surveys and in-depth interviews could 
be readministered but also ask about how messages and channels impacted their attitudes 
towards civilians.  For example, surveys could ask if role playing made opposition 
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members view civilian groups more favorably or less favorably; in-depth interviews 
could ask what opposition members thought about during role playing and how, if at all, 
their views have changed toward civilian sub-groups.  These methods could then be 
reapplied a year later to examine opposition members’ attitudes and how ongoing 
communication efforts, such as mobile apps, may have shaped them.  This study would 
offer value in understanding how trainings and later messaging may have contributed to a 
shift in the opposition’s attitudes over time.  Practitioners could apply the findings to 
enhance or develop future messaging about ceasing civilian targeting that is intended for 
the opposition or similar ANSAs. 
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In-Depth Interview Invitation 
Greetings (Insert name of potential interview participant here), 
My name is Alyssa Deffenbaugh, and I am a graduate student in the Communications 
program at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC.  I received your name and 
contact information from (name of person who recommended the participant).   I am 
conducting a thesis study to look at how organizations are persuading the Syrian armed 
opposition to cease killing and harming civilians.  The study’s findings will help inform 
other communication professionals on how to positively influence the opposition and 
other armed non-state actors in the region.  I would be very grateful for the opportunity to 
interview you for my study and believe your input would be very valuable.  With your 
permission, I would record our discussion, but your identity would be kept confidential 
and your responses would not be connected with your name.   
 
The interview would take place on whatever day and time works best for your schedule.  
I will be conducing the interviews over the Internet using Skype.   Alternatively, if it is 
more convenient for you, I am happy to contact you at a mobile or landline number.  The 
interview would take about an hour.    
 
If you are interested in being interviewed or have any questions, please contact me by 
email at Alyssa.Deffenbaugh@gmail.com, by Skype at lyssd19, or by phone at 001-703-
867-1386.  Also please review the attached consent form and let me know if you have 
any questions.  I will ask for your oral consent at the beginning of the interview.   
 









Skype name: lyssd19 
 
  




Qualitative Content Analysis Sheet 
Instructions  
 For each artifact (videos, training booklet, training module, strategy document, 
conference report, opposition authored code of conduct documents, press releases, 
reports, and letters), answer the questions below where applicable.  The following 
definitions explain some of the terms used in the questions. 
Definitions 
1. Sectarian identity: An individual’s self-perception based on his/her actual or 
perceived membership in a religious sect.  For example, a person may view 
himself/herself as a Sunni Muslim. 
2. Ethnic identity: An individual’s self-perception based on his/her actual or perceived 
membership in an ethnic group.  For example, a person may view himself/herself as 
Arab or Kurdish. 
3. National identity: An individual’s self-perception based on his/her actual or 
perceived membership in a state. For example, a person may view himself/herself as 
Syrian. 
4. Compliance messages: Communications that stressed ways groups would punish the 
opposition for committing civilian targeting or reward the opposition for preventing 
civilian targeting. 
Questions 
The first set of questions asks you to examine how the artifacts represent different 
means for delivering messages to the Syrian opposition. 
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1. What types of channels are NGOs using to reach the Syrian opposition regarding the 
need to cease killing and harming civilians? 
2. What, if any, evidence exists of the Syrian opposition responding to messages 
delivered through certain channels? 
The second set of questions asks you to examine how the artifacts address 
attitudes within the Syrian opposition towards the killing and harming of civilians. 
1. What negative views, if any, do NGOs identify within the Syrian opposition towards 
civilians? 
2. What positive views, if any, do NGOs identify within the Syrian opposition towards 
civilians? 
3. What kinds of views, if any, do NGOs identify within the Syrian opposition towards 
civilians who support the regime?  What kinds of views, if any, do NGOs identify 
within the Syrian opposition towards civilians who support the opposition?   
4. What kinds of views, if any, do NGOs identify within the Syrian opposition towards 
civilians who have a different sectarian identity? 
5. What kinds of views, if any, do NGOs identify within the Syrian opposition towards 
civilians who have a different ethnic identity? 
6. What kind of views, if any, do NGOs identify within the Syrian opposition towards 
civilians who have a different national identity? 
 The last set of questions asks you to consider how the artifacts incorporate 
different persuasive techniques in encouraging the Syrian opposition to cease killing and 
harming civilians. 
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1. What types of, if any, compliance messages are NGOs conveying to the Syrian 
opposition about the killing and harming of civilians?  What are the specific negative 
outcomes for killing and harming civilians?  What are the specific positive outcomes 
for preventing the killing and harming of civilians? 
2. What is the overall tone of the messages?  Describe. 
3. What, if at all, are NGOs proposing other international actors should do to impose 
costs on the Syrian opposition for killing and harming civilians? 
4. What, if at all, are NGOs proposing other international actors should do to reward the 
Syrian opposition for preventing the killing and harming of civilians? 
5. What types of symbols, such as text or images, do NGOs use to convey messages to 
encourage the Syrian opposition to cease killing and harming civilians? 
6. Are messages conveyed in simple formats or with detail?  Describe. 
7. In what ways, if any, are NGOs gaining commitments from the Syrian opposition that 
they will cease the killing and harming of civilians? 
8. How, if at all, has the Syrian opposition responded to these approaches? 
 
9. How, if at all, do NGOs portray themselves in their messages to the Syrian opposition 
regarding the ceasing of killing and harming civilians? 
10. Is organizational information presented simultaneously with messages about not 
killing and harming civilians?  Or is it presented separately?  Describe. 
  




In-Depth Interview Guide 
 
It is a pleasure to be speaking with you and thank you again for participating in my study.  
Our discussion should last about an hour.  I have some questions I will be asking you, but 
before we start I want to ensure you that I will keep your identity confidential.  Your 
name will not be connected with your responses.  
 
Do you have any questions about the consent form that I emailed you?  Do you give your 
consent to participate in the study?  Also, do I have your permission to audio record this 
interview?   
 
Lastly, if I have any questions regarding our discussion today, is it ok if I contact you 
with any follow-up questions?   
 
1. To get started could you tell me briefly about your role in working issues 
regarding Syria and armed non-state actors? 
 
2. As you know, my study specifically focuses on the Syrian armed opposition.  Can 
you tell me about the oppositions’ views towards civilians?   
 
a. What kinds of views, if any, do opposition members have towards 
civilians who support the regime?  
b. What kinds of views, if any, do opposition members have towards 
civilians who oppose the regime? 
c. What kinds of views, if any, do opposition members have towards 
civilians who have a different sectarian identity? 
d. What kinds of views, if any, do opposition members have towards 
civilians who have a different ethnic identity?  
e. What kinds of views, if any, do opposition members have towards 
civilians who are not Syrian nationals? 
 
3. Now, I want to ask you about the messages your organization puts out to the 
Syrian opposition.  Can you tell me about the messages you are trying to convey 
to the opposition regarding the need to prevent the killing and harming of 
civilians? 
 
a. How, if at all, are you framing messages around the costs for the 
continuation of this behavior? 
b. How, if at all, are you framing messages around the benefits of ceasing 
this behavior? 
c. Does the complexity of the message vary at all?  If so, in what ways? 
d. How, if at all, are you framing messages to other actors about the need to 
prevent the opposition from killing and harming civilians? 
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4. What made your organization adopt these particular messages?  
a. Is it based off of your organization’s policies, other organization’s best 
practices, political guidelines, or some other factor?  If so, could you 
describe how this decision was made? 
 
5. What types of messages, if any, have been most effective in changing attitudes 
and behaviors within the opposition regarding preventing the killing and harming 
of civilians?   
a. Can you explain what made these messages effective? 
 
6. What approaches, if any, does your organization take to gain commitments from 
the opposition regarding their willingness not to target civilians? 
 
7. Have certain approaches, if any, been more effective than others?   
a. In what ways have these approaches been more effective? 
 
8. How does your organization portray itself when it communicates with the 
opposition?   
 
9. Lastly, I want to briefly ask you about how your organization disseminates 
messages.  Can you talk about the means you have used to reach out to the 
opposition?   
 
10. What made your organization select these means? 
 
11. Have some means, if any, been more effective than others in reaching the 
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